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Abstract
Over the past decade there has been an explosive growth in the research on civil conflict
which has lead to a general understanding of the underlying factors that contribute to
conflict incidence. Much of the current research results are based on the use of aggregate
data, measures, and analyses. This has the disadvantage that it ignores some of the
details on conflict dynamics as not all information is retained. This thesis provides four
essays that look at civil conflict in Africa, trying to disentangle the complex relation
between conflict and factors such as economic performance, food prices, foreign aid,
and climate. The findings challenge some of the results in the literature. Focussing on
the link between rainfall and conflict, looking at the effect of rainfall shocks in different
economic sectors rather than aggregate output, the results show that although rainfall
has an effect on agricultural and industrial output, this doesn’t influence the outbreak
of conflict. Investigating the relation between food prices and the occurrence of civil
unrest, using within-year variation, shows that there is a weak link where higher food
prices lead to more unrest due to dependence on primary commodity imports. However,
these results do not generalise to out-of-sample data. Examining the effect of foreign
aid on conflict intensity, the empirical analysis shows no strong proof for an effect in
either positive or negative direction contrasting with the literature. Finally, focussing
on the forecasts generated by a popular model linking temperature with conflict shows
that the predictive power of temperature is low. In summary, the work presented in
this thesis provides some new insights into the link between conflict and a variety of
economic factors commonly associated with conflict. It also illustrates the use of various
disaggregated approaches to study conflict dynamics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Civil conflict in
Africa
1.1 Trends in African conflict
The research presented in this thesis tries to disentangle the complex relation between
conflict and factors such as economic performance, food prices, foreign aid, and climate.
Whereas each of the four chapters following this introduction provides an empirical
analysis on the link between these particular factors and conflict, this introductory
chapter aims to give a more generalised overview of civil conflict in Africa.1 This chapter
will describe some of the broader trends and developments concerning conflict that
have taken place across the African continent in the past six decades. Additionally, this
introduction also provides a concise outline of what is covered in the other chapters in
this thesis.
1Note that I focus here on civil conflict as this is the most common type of conflict in Africa.
Interstate conflicts are relatively rare: in the past 25 years there have been only 6 such instances. I
won’t go into detail on the prevalence of interstate conflict in Africa as this is beyond the scope of this
introduction.
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1.1. Trends in African conflict 1. Introduction
The African continent has been the focus of a myriad of studies on civil conflict as
many African countries have experienced protracted periods of violence over the past 60
years. Figure 1.1 shows the number of conflict-years between 1960-2013. It illustrates
that countries without a history of violence, such as Botswana, are relatively rare
exceptions. Most countries had some sort of civil conflict, with varying intensity, within
their country borders in the past sixty years.
Figure 1.1: Number of conflict-years per country, 1960-2013. Data: PRIO/UCDP
If we consider the trend in conflict over time, comparing Africa to the rest of the world
(upper left figure 1.2), we see that over time there has been a steady increase in the
number of conflicts. The upward trends seems to coincide with the decolonisation period
in the 1960s and the Cold War era. During this period the African trend largely mirrors
the world wide increase in conflict.
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1.1. Trends in African conflict 1. Introduction
At least part of this increase can be attributed to exposed rifts between factions in
the decolonisation struggle (see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015)) as well as due
to the involvement of the superpowers in domestic politics in various proxy wars (e.g.
Zaïre, Angola, and Mozambique). It is only after the end of the Cold War and largely
peaceful disintegration of the Soviet block that the African trend starts to diverge from
world wide conflict trends. In other parts of the world there is a noticeable decrease
in the number of conflicts whereas in Africa the number of conflicts at any given year
remains almost unchanged compared to the 1980s peak level.
For many, conflict may seem almost like a characteristic feature of Africa which is
not entirely surprising given that about 75% of the countries have experienced violent
armed conflict since 1946. Since decolonisation in any year around 15 to 25% of African
countries experienced civil conflict within their borders (upper right figure 1.2). However,
as gloomy as these statistics might seem there are some nuances with regard to Africa’s
conflict dynamics.
We already saw that conflict prevalence since the 1990s is higher in Africa compared to
the rest of the world. This seems to be the results of the fact that while in other parts
of the world armed conflicts have terminated since the end of the Cold War (Kreutz,
2010), in Africa we mainly see a continuation of existing conflicts, sometimes only briefly
interrupted (figure 1.3). Many conflicts that we observe in Africa today are conflicts
that have been going on for some time, such as in Sudan and Somalia, but in general
the outbreak of a new conflict is not very common (lower left figure 1.2). There has
been some progress though with the end of bloody post-colonial wars in Angola and
Mozambique as well as the end of various severe civil wars such as in Ivory Coast,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. This has lead to a steady decline in the number battle-related
deaths (lower right figure 1.2), which is also documented in the work by Pinker (2011).
Civil wars, which are conflicts with more than a 1,000 battle-related deaths per year,
17
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are relatively uncommon (again upper right figure 1.2).2
Another important feature of civil conflict is that it tends to be highly localised.
For most cases of civil conflict we see that these conflicts occur in particular regions,
but that not necessarily the entire country is in engulfed in violence. For example, the
statistics show that Ethiopia has experienced more than 50 years of conflict in the past
60 years. However, the conflict intensity if often low and very localised. Focussing on
the period between 1989-2010 for which we have good sub-national data (figure 1.4) we
can see that although various battle events occur throughout the country, the number
of battle events is low and occur predominantly in the Ogaden region near the Somali
border.3 This is just one example where we see that conflict seems to be confined to
a particular region. There are similar patterns in other countries. Examples of this
include Acholiland in Northern Uganda, the Kivu region in the Eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the current unrest in the North of Nigeria.
2This figure of course doesn’t capture other human suffering that these conflicts often cause such as
displaced populations.
3These events are likely influenced by the situation in Somalia itself.
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1.2 Thesis outline
Over the past decade there has been an explosive growth in the research on civil
conflict which has lead to a general understanding of some of the underlying factors
that contribute to conflict incidence (see Dixon (2009) and Blattman and Miguel (2010)
for an overview). The research presented in this thesis focuses on Africa and consists
of four chapters that each provide an empirical analysis of how four factors (economic
performance; food prices; foreign aid; climate) are linked to civil conflict.
Chapter two examines the relation between income shocks and conflict in Sub-Sahara
Africa between 1981-2010. Income shocks are instrumented by rainfall due to possible
endogeneity in GDP data as conflict feedbacks into economic performance. So far
the literature on rainfall and conflict has produced inconclusive results. One of the
shortcomings in the literature that I address is that rather than looking at the effect
of rainfall on aggregate output I estimate the effect in different economic sectors (agri-
cultural and industrial). Using aggregate output might not be appropriate to estimate
the effect of income shocks on conflict as rainfall likely affects each economic sector
differently. Re-examining the link between income shocks and conflict, accounting for
these diverging effects, I find that there does not seem to be strong evidence for a
link between rainfall and conflict. Although rainfall affects both the agricultural and
industrial sector, its effect on aggregate output is weak and the link with conflict is not
robust to different model specifications.
Chapter three provides a study on the effect of food prices on the incidence of vi-
olence in Africa between 1990-2012. The real level effect of food prices on violence is
estimated using a country-specific food price index based on a country’s import pattern
of major food commodities based on international food prices as they are a source of
exogenous shocks. The regression results show that between 1990-2011 increases in
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the food price index are associated with higher levels of violence. Moving from low to
high values in the price index corresponds, after controlling for economic, social, and
political factors, with an increase in violence intensity of 1.3 incidents. This effect seems
to be predominantly driven by imports of low-value added primary products. Despite
the statistically significant results the predictive power of food prices is relatively low
though. To scrutinise the results I use out-of-sample data from 2012 for cross-validation.
The results indicate that the model correctly predicts only 36.8% of violent incidents
and in general underestimates violence intensity.
The fourth chapter looks at the link between foreign aid and conflict intensity. Although
most aid projects are aimed at local development and conflict tends to be highly localised,
most research on aid and conflict uses the country-year as unit of analysis. A lot of
information is potentially lost due to this level of aggregation. I address this issue by
examining the nexus at the sub-national level for three African countries (Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan) between 1999-2008, using a unique dataset with
information on local aid projects. The data shows that while aid is generally allocated
relatively close to the capital, conflicts occur mainly in the peripheral areas. In contrast
with the existing literature the study results do not show a strong effect aid on conflict.
The analysis provides relatively little empirical support for a link in either positive or
negative direction. However, some of the results do indicate that non-fungible aid, or
aid that is not easily diverted from its intended purpose, corresponds with decreases in
conflict levels. This might suggest that aid increases the opportunity costs of rebellion,
although the magnitude of the effect is very low.
The fifth and final chapter is slightly different in character as it provides a critique
on the literature rather than presenting results from new research. It focuses on the
research on climate-conflict, although the suggestions made probably also apply to the
larger conflict literature. Within the quantitative literature on violent armed conflict
22
1.2. Thesis outline 1. Introduction
we see that there is a heated debate on the effect of climate change on the incidence
of civil conflict. This discussion predominantly focuses on the robustness of results
to different model specifications and extended datasets. However, there is very little
attention for the forecasts generated by the models. Generated predicted probabilities
are largely ignored and not included in the analysis. In this chapter I try to illustrate
that examination of a model’s forecast can be a useful analytical tool to scrutinise a
model’s performance. The study focuses on the link between temperature and conflict
in Sub-Sahara Africa between 1981-2002 and finds that although the regression model
has large in-sample predictive power, the performance of the temperature variable is
low. Generating out-of-sample predictions for 2003-2013 illustrates that temperature
has almost no predictive power.
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Chapter 2
Economic shocks and civil
conflict onset in Sub-Sahara
Africa, 1981-2010
2.1 Introduction
Economic conditions are often singled out as a prime cause of conflict. The empirical
literature has, over the years, provided a substantial amount of proof for the claim that
low income levels and poor economic performance are associated with conflict (for an
overview of the literature see Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Dixon (2009), and Blattman
and Miguel (2010)). Within the literature two patterns can be distinguished: firstly that
poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from conflict, and secondly that conflict
occurs when countries suffer from negative income shocks (Chassang and Padró i Miquel,
2009). One region in particular has been the focus of much research: Sub-Sahara Africa
(henceforth Africa). This region harbours some of the poorest countries in the world
and has high conflict prevalence levels, especially compared to similar regions in Asia
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and the Americas. Although poor countries are disproportionally involved in conflict,
the direction of the effect may be difficult to establish (Besley and Persson, 2008). A
common problem is that a lot of research suffers from endogeneity issues, particularly
reverse causality. There are also other issues such as omitted-variable bias and the fact
that data quality for countries of interest is generally poor (Heston, 1994).
To account for these problems Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) (henceforth
MSS) use an instrumental variable (IV) approach, exploiting variation in rainfall as a
source of exogenous shocks to income. In their seminal work they found that economic
growth is strongly related to civil conflict, with low growth rates increasing the risk of
conflict.1 Over the years, a number of other studies have examined the relationship
between rainfall variation and conflict, using rainfall as either a measure for changes
in climate or to proxy for economic conditions. So far the results have been mixed
with no clear consensus on the direction of the effect (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Brück-
ner and Ciccone, 2010; Ciccone, 2011; Koubi et al., 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012;
Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014b).
In this chapter I re-examine the relationship between variation in rainfall, economic
shocks, and conflict using the latest data on Africa for 1981-2010 and by focussing on
conflict onset in order to identify a possible causal link. In contrast with the exist-
ing cross-country literature, I also examine the effect that income shocks in different
economic sectors have on the probability of the outbreak of conflict. As Dunning
(2008) notes, the likelihood of conflict could be influenced by the sector of the economy
experiencing the shock. Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) give a theoretical framework arguing
that not all positive shocks to the economy will reduce the probability of conflict but
that it depends on the sector and its labour intensity relative to the economy. Within
1Due to the innovative approach their paper has quickly become one of the standard works in the
literature. It has been cited 375 times since it was published in 2004 (according to Web of Knowledge
in April 2015)
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this framework positive shocks to labour intensive sectors will diminish conflict risk
while positive shocks to capital intensive sectors will increase the risk. Dube and Vargas
(2013) illustrate this in a study on the effects of exogenous price shocks in international
commodity prices on the intensity of violence in the Columbian civil war. Their results
show that a fall in prices of labour-intensive agricultural good (coffee) increased violence
in regions dependent on income from the agricultural sector due to the fact that lower
wages also lowered the opportunity costs of joining armed groups. In contrast, a fall in
the price of capital-intensive natural resources (oil in this case) decreased violence as it
lowered municipal revenue and thus the value of contestable resources.
This study contributes to this strand of literature by examining the effect that shocks
in different economic sectors have on the probability of conflict onset, focussing on
the agricultural and industrial sector. Since the agricultural sector in Africa is labour
intensive, negative shocks to this sector are expected to increase conflict likelihood
according to the analysis by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) and Dube and Vargas (2013).
Where Dube and Vargas (2013) provide empirical evidence for the theoretical framework
of Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011), the main contribution of this chapter is that, to the best
of my knowledge, it is the first cross-country study that examines the effect of different
economic sectors on civil conflict. I solely focus on conflict onset, rather than conflict
incidence, as the former is more appropriate to establish a causal link. The main issue
with using conflict incidence as the outcome variable is that the assumption that rainfall
or economic shocks affect the continuation of conflict in the same way as the outbreak
of new conflict is problematic on theoretical grounds and likely to be violated (Ciccone,
2011; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). Considering the costs associated with initiating a
conflict, and those with joining an already ongoing conflict, it is straightforward to
see that these costs will be different. Since conflict disrupts the economy and affects
economic performance, the opportunity costs for joining an already existing rebellion
will be lower compared to those of initiating a new conflict (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998).
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Using conflict incidence as the outcome variable neglects the issue of reverse causality
between conflict and economic performance and therefore one cannot make any causal
claims about the examined link.
In the analysis I find that rainfall is a viable instrument for economic growth al-
though the effect of rainfall on aggregate economic growth becomes considerably weaker
after 2000. Moreover, using year-on-year rainfall growth as an instrument gives consid-
erably weaker results compared to using rainfall anomalies. Current shocks in rainfall
are significantly and positively linked to economic growth where a standard deviation
increase in rainfall corresponds to a 0.5 to 1 percentage point increase in economic
growth. This is considerable considering the average economic growth of Africa for
1981-2010. The effect of rainfall on productivity is strongest in the agricultural sector
but there is also a positive and significant effect in the industrial sector. This might
be due to the importance of hydro-electricity as well as the use of water as a cooling
agent in factories (Barrios et al., 2010). With regard to the link between rainfall and
conflict the results are very mixed. In a reduced form estimation I find that lagged
shocks in rainfall affect conflict onset but the coefficients are only marginally statistically
significant and not robust to different model specifications. In a model estimated using
IV, with economic growth rates predicted by variability in rainfall, the results are similar
with a marginally statistical significant effect for lagged growth rates. If I instrument
economic growth with year-on-year rainfall growth I find that lagged growth rates are
negatively associated with conflict onset at 90 % confidence level, but the results are
again not robust to different model specifications such as using rainfall anomalies as
an instrument or using a different outcome variable. Using an outcome variable with
a 5-year intermittency period for conflict I do find that the direction of the effect is
consistent -though not significant- across the various models: higher levels of rainfall
reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of conflict. The estimation results are inconclusive
with regard to the effect of shocks in the different sectors of the economy on conflict
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onset. For both the agricultural and industrial sector it seems that positive shocks are
linked to a decreased probability of conflict onset but the estimates are characterized
by large uncertainty. Moreover, the coefficients are lower compared to aggregate output
and statistically insignificant. I am therefore hesitant to make any strong claims with
regard to how different sectors influence conflict likelihood.
2.2 Existing literature
One of the major issues in the conflict literature is that research results are often not
robust to different model specifications, the use of different data or hampered by issues
such as endogeneity (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). One of the very few findings that
does seem to be robust however is the nexus between economic conditions and conflict
(see Dixon (2009) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an overview).2
Within the literature there are two main patterns: one is that poor countries have a
high propensity to experience civil conflict and the second is that civil conflict is more
likely to occur when a country suffers from negative income shocks (Chassang and Padró
i Miquel, 2009). A prominent example is Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) who argue that
poorer countries are more likely to experience conflict due to lower opportunity costs for
rebellion. When a country experiences disappointing economic growth rates utility max-
imising arguments prevail over arguments of political marginalisation as an explanation
for conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) on the other hand argue that poor economic per-
formance is a proxy for weak state capacity. Governmental incompetence, expressed in
a weak military apparatus and poor infrastructure, hampers deterrence and capabilities
to quell insurgencies. These low repressive capabilities connect poverty and civil conflict.
It can be hard to establish the direction of causality between economic conditions
2The paper by Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) is one of the few that contradicts the conclusion
that poverty is a main determinant of conflict.
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and conflict due to issues such as omitted variables bias and endogeneity. The paper by
MSS is one of the pioneering works in addressing these issues and has quickly become
one of the pillars of the conflict literature. The authors use rainfall growth as an
instrument for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth and show that positive
rainfall growth is strongly negatively correlated with civil conflict. This effect is not
significantly different for richer, more democratic, or more ethnic diverse countries. A
number of other studies have looked at the link between rainfall and conflict, either
examining the direct relationship or by using rainfall to proxy for economic growth.3
The paper by Hendrix and Glaser (2007) looks at the effect of interannual changes in
rainfall and conflict onset in Africa and finds that positive shocks have a pacifying effect
and reduce the likelihood of conflict, very similar to the results by MSS. Hendrix and
Glaser (2007) argue that short-term shocks in rainfall (yearly growth rate) are a better
predictor of conflict than changes in the overall climate over a longer period of time.
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) find that civil war and violent insurgencies are more likely
to follow after a year of abundant rainfall, relative to the historical expectation. Thus
linking higher rates of rainfall with conflict, contrasting with earlier results. The study
by Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) on Eastern Africa finds that the frequency of rebel and
communal conflict events increases in periods of extreme rainfall variation and that the
effect is present in both cases of negative and positive variation.
This results is somewhat similar to the study by Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) who use
a disaggregated approach combining rainfall data with geo-referenced events data on the
occurrence of communal conflict in Africa between 1990 and 2008. The main difference
between these two studies is the direction of the effect as Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012)
find that only large negative deviations from the historical mean are associated with a
higher risk of communal conflict. Rather than focussing on the direct effects of rainfall
and conflict, Koubi et al. (2012) examine the causal pathway linking climatic conditions
3In this short review I focus on the papers that have looked at the link between rainfall and conflict.
For an insight into the relation between rainfall and economic growth I refer to Barrios et al. (2010)
and Dell et al. (2012).
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to economic growth and violent conflict. In their analysis they find no evidence for the
claim that rainfall, or climatic variability in general, affects economic growth.
The MSS paper has also attracted a fair share of criticism based on that the model
is agnostic to the sector experiencing the shock (Dunning, 2008), the fact that they
erroneously code the outcome variable to include countries participating in civil wars in
other states (Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009), and most forcefully by Ciccone (2011) who
argues that the results are driven by a positive correlation between conflict in t and
rainfall in t− 2.
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2.3 Data and measurement
2.3.1 Civil conflict
Data on conflict onset comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version
4-2011 (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011) limiting the outcome variable to only instances
of intrastate or civil conflict. I include all cases with at least 25 battle-related deaths
in a single year.4 I do not discriminate between conflict and war, the latter typically
classified passing the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths in a single year.5
To capture the outbreak of conflict I define a binary onset-indicator for country c
in year t that is 1 if there is a conflict in year t but not in year t− 1 and 0 if there is no
conflict in both year t and t− 1. If there is a conflict in year t− 1 then the indicator is
not defined for t:
Onset

1 if conflict in t but not t− 1
0 if no conflict in t and t− 1
. if conflict in t− 1
(2.1)
When trying to identify the relation between outcome and explanatory variables, there
is a difference whether one uses incidence or onset. As Bazzi and Blattman (2014)
note, there are both conceptual and empirical problems with the approach of using
4Data is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Civil conflicts
are all observations coded as type 3 or 4 in the data set. A type 3 conflict is defined as "an internal
armed conflict that occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition
group(s) without the intervention from other states". A type 4 conflict is similar only allowing for the
intervention from other states on behalf of one or both sides (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
5A conflict is defined as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”.
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conflict incidence.6 Conceptually, using conflict incidence one assumes that rainfall and
economic growth affect the continuation of existing conflicts in the same way as the
outbreak of new ones (Ciccone, 2011). From the literature we know that violence is
associated with shocks as it affects wages (Besley and Persson, 2011), accordingly we
would therefore expect that the effect of such shocks is larger in pre-existing conflicts
than it is for new conflicts. Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) note that starting an insurgency
is costly as it brings with it the opportunity costs of rebel labour as well as the costs
incurred by the disruption of the economy. A rebellion will therefore only occur if the
benefits outweigh the costs. Starting a conflict includes some fixed costs. In the case of
an already ongoing conflict this fixed start-up cost is essentially lifted. Meaning that the
opportunity costs for joining the rebellion are lower than those of initiating a rebellion.
Since the costs are higher for initiating a conflict, this also means that new conflicts are
less sensitive to economic shocks compared to existing ones. Estimating the effect of
economic shocks on conflict incidence therefore potentially overestimates the magnitude
of the effect.
There is also an empirical problem due to the omission of the lagged outcome variable.
Conflicts are very persistent over time and often are linked to previous conflicts. Con-
flicts that occur in t are often affected by both current (t) and lagged (t− 1) shocks. By
omitting the lagged outcome variable one introduces a large correlation in the model
between the outcome variable, the shocks, and the error term (Bazzi and Blattman,
2014). Using conflict incidence also doesn’t account for the possible reverse causality
between conflict and economic growth.
6The conflict incidence indicator is coded as:
Incidence
{
1 if conflict in t
0 if no conflict in t
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An example for this is given in table 2.1 where the economic performance (GDP per
capita growth) is given for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during the
First and Second Congo War from 1995 to 2003. It is easy to see that the use of conflict
incidence as outcome variable would give misleading results as it doesn’t account for the
feedback of conflict into the economy. The occurrence of conflict will affect economic
conditions irrespective of changes in rainfall, which is used as an instrument to proxy for
these economic conditions, thereby introducing a form of endogeneity into the model.7
I argue therefore that conflict onset is a better outcome variable as it accounts for past
conflicts and also is better equipped to deal with the mentioned issues and thus better
suited to uncover the causal mechanism between rainfall and conflict.
Additionally, as a robustness check I also estimate the model with a different onset-
indicator which uses a 5-year intermittency period in order to account for any mid-term
carry-over effects of previous conflict. In this case the onset-indicator is only set to 1 if
there is a conflict in year t conditional on that there hasn’t been any conflict in the
past 5 years.
Table 2.1: DRC during the 1st and 2nd Congo War
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Economic growth(%) −2.5 −3.7 −7.8 −3.7 −6.3 −9.2 −4.7 0.5 2.6
Incidence 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Onset 0 1 − − − − − − 0
2.3.2 Rainfall
Time-series data on rainfall comes from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology
Project (GPCP), Version 2.2 (Adler et al., 2003). The dataset provides worldwide
7An additional problem is the systematic measurement error in conflict-countries due to the collapse
of public institutions that provide the data.
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monthly mean precipitation given as a daily average (in mm) and covers 1979-2010.
The estimates are the result of the combination of a number of sources, taking the
advantage of each data type to get the best possible estimate. Values are based on the
information coming from gauge stations as well as microwave, infrared, and sounder
data from satellites. The data sources are blended together to produce a global gridded
precipitation field with the precipitation data at a 2.5 x 2.5 degree resolution, which
corresponds to roughly 250 by 250 Km at the equator.
The two main advantages of this dataset, over the more traditional precipitation data,
is that it is less likely to suffer from classical and non-classical measurement error. Data
supplied by meteorological institutes comes predominantly from gauge stations and due
to the sparseness of operating gauge stations in Sub-Sahara Africa, this might lead to
classical measurement error. The number of operating gauge stations might be affected
by socio-economic conditions which could lead to non-classical measurement error.
Aggregating the rainfall data from the grid-level to the country-level can produce coarse
estimates due to the relative low resolution of the raster (Auffhammer et al., 2013).
For some smaller countries aggregation will not produce an estimate at all due to the
fact that their national territory does not cover enough space in a grid-box. A way to
overcome this problem is by assigning the value of the nearest cell to the particular
country as is done by Miguel et al. (2004) and Brückner and Ciccone (2010). Although
this is a pragmatic solution it ignores the fact that if this problem affects small-sized
countries, it can also affect certain regions of larger countries thereby thus producing
skewed estimates for these countries neglecting within-country variation in rainfall.
A simple solution for this problem is artificially increasing the resolution of the raster.8
Figure 2.1 illustrates this approach for the Great Lakes region. The left panel shows
a graphical representation of the grid overlay at the original resolution. It shows that
countries like Rwanda and Burundi are too small, in terms of coverage of a grid-cell, to
8Many thanks to Robert Hall from the South East Asia Research group at Royal Holloway for
suggesting this method.
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get an estimate. It also shows that this issue could occur in parts of Malawi and the
DRC.9 The right panel in the figure shows the grid overlay on the national boundaries
after I increased the resolution. In this case the resolution was increased from a 2.5
x 2.5 degree raster to a 0.5 x 0.5 degree raster, which is roughly 56 x 56 Km at the
equator.10 Dividing the grid-boxes into smaller boxes is a purely technical solution in
order to get a better fit between the raster and the national boundaries resulting in
more precise estimates when aggregating the data to the national level.11 The rainfall
data is aggregated to country-year level taking into account the number of days in
each month, corrected for leap years, in order to obtain a weighted yearly average for
each country.12 Although this method provides theoretical advantages, in practice the
Figure 2.1: Geographic raster for Great Lakes region in Africa at 2.5◦ x 2.5◦ (left)
and 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ (right).
difference between the methods of aggregation is small.13 There are some systematic
9At the original resolution aggregating returns no estimates for the following countries: Burundi,
Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe. For the Seychelles the higher resolution aggregation method also does not return an estimate.
10Hendrix and Glaser (2007) use a similar method, they refine the raster to 1 x 1 degree resolution
and assign cells to countries on the basis of majority.
11Note that each of the smaller grid-cells has the same value as the larger original grid-cell. This
approach does not change anything about the measurements and therefore does not take into account
any within-cell variation.
12Rainct = dJanct ∗ 31 + dFebct ∗ 28 + ...+ dDecct ∗ 31
13The time-series correlation is 0.99.
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differences between the two time-series though, especially for the smaller countries such
as Benin, Equatorial Guinea, and Rwanda.14
To estimate the effect of rainfall on economic growth and civil conflict I use inter-
annual growth and anomalies as a measure for rainfall shocks. Interannual growth is
measured as the percentage change in annual rainfall R for country c in year t relative
to the previous year t− 1: (Rct −Rc,t−1)/Rc,t−1.
A shortcoming of using interannual growth as a measure is that it tells us little about
the relative abundance or shortage of rainfall for a particular country in a given year,
compared to the historical expectations. If for a given country c, rainfall in year t
was above average it is very likely that rainfall in year t+ 1 will be lower due to the
mean-reverting nature of rainfall making rainfall shocks very transitory. Mean-reverting
would therefore imply that ∆Rct is negative although the country could still experience
above average levels of rainfall (Ciccone, 2011).
14The high correlation between the two methods of aggregation can be explained by the fact that
most African countries have very arbitrary boundaries. At the 1884-1885 Berlin conference a majority
of borders were drawn along meridians and parallels. 44% of African borders follow meridians and
parallels while 30% follow other rectilinear or curved lines (Alesina et al., 2011; McCauley and Posner,
2014).
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Consider the example in figure 2.2 : the dashed line represents the country average
and the spikes are the levels of rainfall for each observation in time. Using year-on-year
growth as a measure we would have a negative growth rate at t = 4 and a positive
growth rate at t = 6. Looking at the country average however we can see that rainfall in
t = 4 is above average and rainfall in t = 6 is below average. To better account for both
Figure 2.2: Example of precipitation over time, illustrating that negative growth
rates could still correspond with positive rainfall levels relative to the mean.
cross-country variation in the mean values as well as within-panel variation, rainfall
anomalies are used as an additional measure (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). Anomalies
are measured as the annual standardized rainfall deviation from the long term panel
mean for a given country, (Rct − R¯c)/σc.15
The data shows that the majority of observations has the same sign for growth and
anomalies. For about a quarter of the observations the signs of the two measures are
different though which is a substantial part of the dataset.16
15Long term is in this case the period from 1979 to 2010
16 490 observations (35%) are both positive and 527 observations (38%) are both negative. In
188 observations where anomalies have a positive sign the growth rate is negative (14%) and for 184
observations where the deviations from the panel mean are negative the growth rate is positive (13%).
See figure A.1 for rainfall distribution per country.
37
2.3. Data and measurement 2. Economic shocks and civil conflict onset
2.3.3 Economic growth
Data for economic growth is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) for
47 countries in Africa between 1981-2010 (World Bank, 2012).17 The WDI is used as
source because of recent concerns with the figures for growth in the commonly used
Penn World Tables data (Dell et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2013). Income growth is
measured as the interannual growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant U.S.$ to
capture international purchasing power.
2.3.4 Other explanatory variables
A number of other explanatory variables are used to account for specific country-
characteristics that are commonly associated with civil conflict in the literature. The
model I use is predominantly based on the one used by Miguel et al. (2004).
Peace years are included to account for the fact that the likelihood of conflict strongly
depends on the occurrence of previous conflicts. This variable is measured as the
number of years that have passed since the last incidence of conflict.18 The size of
the population is often correlated with conflict as larger populations imply difficulties
in controlling local level activity and increase the pool from which insurgents can be
recruited (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Another risk of larger populations with regard
to resources is that they put additional pressure on the existing resource base which
could lead to both relative and absolute scarcity of essential resources such as fresh
water. I include the lagged value of the natural log of the total population in the
model specification with data taken from the WDI. Empirical evidence shows that there
is a curvilinear relationship between regime type and conflict (Hegre and Sambanis,
17The dataset is weakly unbalanced due to the fact that Namibia and Eritrea gained independence
in 1990 and 1993 respectively. The model estimations include 46 countries due to the lack of data for
Somalia.
18Peace years are thus measured as the absence of any violence that resulted in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a given year. If there hasn’t been any conflict I count the number of years since the
country gained independence.
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2006). Both extreme autocracies and democracies are less likely to experience civil
conflict in contrast with regime types that fall between these two extremes, so called
anocracies.19 The square of the polity2 index from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al.,
2013) is used to control for this relation. The variable is lagged to deal with possible
endogeneity issues.20 Another demographic control is the population’s heterogeneity or
ethnic composition for which I use the PREG index (Posner, 2004). The PREG index
only includes politically relevant groups and allows the values to vary per decade, giving
a better representation of the political ethnic composition of a country over time. Most
other indices on ethnolinguistic fractionalisation are time fixed and often based on data
from the 1960s. Moreover they include all ethnographically distinct groups in a country
irrespective of whether they engage in political competition.21
Countries with more rough terrain experience higher probabilities of conflict as this
terrain provides easier shelter for insurgents and mountainous regions can be difficult
to control for governments (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). I measure rough terrain as the
percentage of total land area covered by mountains, data taken from Garcia-Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005). Throughout the literature, oil-rich countries are strongly
associated with conflict onset as the availability of oil can lure insurgents as it provides
an extra prize when successfully contesting state power (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross,
2004; Lujala, 2010). The availability of oil revenues can also create a gap between
government and population as it provides an easy source of income reducing the need
for taxation and thus interaction with the population (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002). This
perceived distance can cause frictions if a group has the feeling that the revenues are
not being equally distributed. Examples of this include Cabinda province in Angola and
19Anocracies are more vulnerable due to political instability, the result of the spread of power among
elitist groups constantly competing with each other for power. Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe are some
examples.
20Conflict incidence is used in the measurement of regime types.
21The PREG index covers 41 of the 47 countries in the panel, data fromAlesina et al. (2003) is used
to supplement for the missing countries: Cape Verde, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania, and
Sao Tome and Principe.
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the situation between Sudan and South Sudan. I use a lagged oil dummy that takes
value 1 if oil rents contribute to more than 33% of GDP in a given year, and 0 for all
other cases. Data taken from WDI.
2.3.5 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.3 visualises descriptive statistics for economic growth, precipitation, and con-
flict.22 In terms of economic growth, Africa has experienced on average slow growth
rates but there has been an increasing trend since 2000. On average GDP per capita
growth has been around 1% with a standard deviation of 8 percentage points. 1981-1999
has been characterised by large fluctuations with extremes ranging from -50% to 93%.
Since 2000 growth rates have stabilised to an average annual growth rate of 2% and
a standard deviation of 5 percentage points.23 Rainfall variation is enormous (upper
right): while the wettest country in the sample (Sierra Leone) has an average rainfall of
2311 mm per year, the driest country (Mauritania) has an annual rainfall of just 118
mm per year. There is no clear trend with regard to shifts in rainfall: on average rainfall
has decreased over the past 30 years but there have been unusual spells of relatively
wet years such as between 1994-2000.24
Compared to similar regions in the world, conflict prevalence is high in Africa al-
though the total number of conflicts has been decreasing. About 1 in 5 observations
is coded for conflict while conflict onset is a much rarer occurrence with 1 in 20 ob-
servations. Since the 1990s the number of conflicts has decreased.25 Almost all of the
22See table A.1 and figure A.1 for summary statistics.
23Some countries perform exceptionally well in comparison to the average; Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon, two major oil exporters; Botswana, which has large diamond and nickel deposits; Mauritius
which has a successful diversified agricultural economy; and South Africa which has a relatively successful
mixed economy.
24A period of 30 years is fairly short in climatic terms to distinguish clear trends. However, other
research has shown that over a longer period of time rainfall levels in Africa have reduced (Nicholson,
2001; Buhaug, 2010; Barrios et al., 2010).
25There has only been a noticeable spike between 2007-2009.
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conflicts are minor conflicts, which are conflicts with between 25 and 1000 battle-related
deaths in a given year.26
26Civil wars with more than a 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year are relatively rare. In the
dataset only 5 observations are coded for onset of a civil war, 2 of which followed the onset of a minor
conflict. In this chapter I focus on intrastate conflict and not interstate conflicts. Between 1981-2010
there were only 7 cases of interstate conflict, and only one which lasted more than a year (Ethiopia vs.
Eritrea from 1998 to 2000).
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2.4 Estimation framework
The main equation links conflict onset to per capita economic growth and other ex-
planatory variables, where economic growth is instrumented by rainfall.
onsetct = ac + bX ′ct + c0growthct + c1growthc,t−1 + dcyeart + ect (2.2)
I focus on civil conflict onset in country c in year t, where the principal onset indicator is
based on the absence of conflict in the previous year t−1. In most specifications country-
specific time trends (yeart) are included in order to deal with additional variation and a
disturbance term (ect) that is allowed to be serially correlated. The errors are clustered
at the country level. To capture some of the time-invariant country characteristics
that might be related to conflict, country-fixed effects (ac) are included in some of the
models. I also estimate the model accounting for country characteristics (X ′ct).
A reduced-form model is estimated with OLS and Rare Event Logit (King and Zeng,
2001) using the model:
onsetct = ac + bX ′ct + c0∆rainct + c1∆rainc,t−1 + dcyeart + ect (2.3)
In the first-stage I regress economic growth in t on changes in rainfall in t and t− 1,
using the same controls as in the main equation. In the first-stage I also estimate the
effect of rainfall on the agricultural and industrial sector as opposed to whole economic
output. In the second stage economic growth rate is instrumented by the predicted
values from the first stage. Changes in rainfall are captured by either the interannual
growth rate or anomalies.
growthct = ac + bX ′ct + c0∆rainct + c1∆rainc,t−1 + dcyeart + ect (2.4)
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To test the robustness of the results I use a different outcome variable with a 5-year
intermittency period for conflict onset.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 First stage results
Table 2.2: Effect of rainfall on economic growth, 1981-2010 (IV−2SLS, first stage)
Rainfall measure Growth Anomaly
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfallt 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rainfallt−1 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peace years 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Populationt−1 (log) 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Square Polity2t−1 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita1979 (log) 0.16 0.08
(0.94) (0.96)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization −0.06 −0.08
(0.09) (0.10)
Rough terrain −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Oil-exporting country 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Country FE − Yes − − Yes −
Country-specific year trend − Yes Yes − Yes Yes
Root MSE 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
N 1299 1299 1162 1299 1299 1162
Notes. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Estimates rounded to two decimals.
Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤
0.05, *≤ 0.1
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Using the latest data for 1981-2010 I estimate the first-stage model regressing GDP
per capita growth on rainfall. Results are shown in table 2.2 where column 1-3 depict
the results for the model specifications where I regress economic growth on rainfall
growth and column 4-6 for rainfall anomalies. I find a positive and significant relation
between economic growth and rainfall similar to the results by MSS.27 Focussing on
interannual growth the effect is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects, country controls,
and time trends. A standard deviation increase in rainfall accounts for a difference in
economic growth of 0.7 percentage points over years t and t+ 1 which is a substantial
effect considering the average growth rate for African economies between 1981-2010.
The uncertainty with which we can link rainfall to economic growth increases when
introducing controls into the model.28 Moreover the strength of rainfall as an instrument
is severely reduced as the F-statistic drops from 7 to 2.7. As a result the coefficients on
economic growth in the second stage estimations will be biased towards OLS-estimates
(Bound et al., 1995; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Estimating the model with anomalies
also shows that current changes in rainfall are positively related to economic growth at
1% significance with the magnitude of the effect being similar to the models in columns
1-3.29 The coefficient for lagged deviations is near 0 and statistically insignificant. I
do find that the two coefficients are jointly significant at a 99% confidence level. The
results seem to indicate that anomalies are actually a stronger instrument with the
F-statistic ranging from 9.4 to 12.2. All country controls show statistical insignificant
effects and exhibit small coefficients sizes. The results show that for a longer time period
rainfall is still a viable instrument for economic growth, although the magnitude of the
effect has diminished over time and in some cases rainfall is a weak instrument.30 In
their original work MSS also found that rainfall was a weak instrument. Moreover, in a
27I also re-estimate the MSS model using their dataset and changing their rainfall data with the new
rainfall estimates. The results for this are in the annex in table A.2.
28When using time-fixed effects to control for common shocks only current rainfall growth rates are
significantly linked to economic growth.
29The size of the coefficient in columns 4-6 is 0.01 but this is due to rounding as the real coefficient is
0.006.
30See table A.2 in the annex for the first-stage estimations per period.
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re-examination of their work they found that the first-stage relationship between rainfall
and economic growth became weaker after 2000 as neither rainfall growth in year t or
t− 1 was significantly correlated with economic growth in year t (Miguel and Satyanath,
2011). I also find that after 2000 the link between rainfall and economic growth becomes
very weak. This trend might be related to the unprecedented economic growth Africa
has experienced in the past decade as Miguel and Satyanath (2011) suggest. From 1981
to 2010 the agricultural share of GDP has decreased by about 6 percentage points,
from 19% to 13%, with a very sharp decline since 2002. Taking the two economic
powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa, out of the equation the decline is even larger
with 12 percentage points. Rainfall is vital to productivity in the agricultural sector due
to the fact that in Africa most arable land is rain-fed and irrigation is almost absent.
However, the relevance of rainfall to economic performance is not limited to only the
primary sector as other sectors also depend on rainfall due to the prominence of water
to generate electricity and as a secondary input in the industrial sector (Barrios et al.,
2010).31
I regress the output from the agricultural and industrial sector on rainfall to determine
the separate effects (see table 2.3 for results).32 As expected the agricultural sector
shows the stronger relation between rainfall and productivity illustrated by the relative
large coefficient size compared to GDP per capita growth. The sign for anomalies in
t− 1 is a bit counter-intuitive however, indicating that higher rainfall deviations in t
reduce output in t+ 1. There is a bit more uncertainty about the link between rainfall
and industrial output. For all estimations the coefficient for rainfall in year t is 0 (or
near zero) and statistically insignificant. Rainfall in year t−1 does seem to be correlated
with industrial output in year t according to the majority of the estimations where
31According to Barrios et al. (2010) hydro-electricity represents about 47 % of total power generation
in Africa.
32I used the agriculture and industry value added in constant dollars from the World Bank Development
Indicators and calculated a per capita measure to normalize across countries (same approach was used
for the service sector).
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especially the models using anomalies show a strong link.33
33I also estimate the effect of rainfall on output in the service sector and find some statistically
significant results but in all cases the coefficient has a size near zero and further tests show that rainfall
is a very weak instrument with F-values below 2.
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2.5.2 Rainfall and conflict onset
Examining the between-country differences in rainfall for countries with conflict onset
and other countries there is no clearly distinguishable trend concerning rainfall levels or
variation and a higher likelihood of observing conflict onset. On average countries that
had at least one observation of onset tend to be wetter although the difference with
the other countries falls well within the standard deviation of rainfall in the sample.34
Looking at growth rates and deviations the data shows that countries that had conflict
onset have lower growth rates but experience larger deviations.35
I estimate the relation between rainfall and conflict using a reduced form estimation,
the results for which are shown in table 2.4. The results provide little empirical support
for the claim that variation in rainfall contributes to conflict onset at the country-level.
Across the various model specifications current variation in rainfall is positively linked
with conflict onset. Higher levels of rainfall relative to last year or the panel mean
correspond with an increased chance of conflict. However, the estimated coefficients are
not statistically significant and come with large uncertainty as all t-values are below
1.36 Lagged rainfall has the expected sign indicating that lower levels of rainfall increase
conflict likelihood. These coefficients come with a bit more certainty as the t-values
are consistently larger than 1 and in some of the models the coefficient is one-sided
significant at the 10 % level giving some certainty about the direction of the effect.37
I also estimate the model using a dummy for extreme rainfall deviations (σ ≥ 1 or
σ ≤ −1) but did not find any support for the claim that these extreme variations are
341039 mm versus 993 mm, a margin of only 47 mm.
35Countries that had a case of conflict onset on average have a growth rate of 1.6%, a 1.9 percentage
point difference with the countries that didn’t (3.5%). In terms of anomalies, countries with conflict
onset have an average yearly deviation of -0.01 against 0 for the other countries. Countries with conflict
onset include 471 observations leaving 918 observations for the other countries.
36Z-value in case of the rare event logit estimation.
37This is the case for columns 1, 4, and 6. These results are robust at the 90 % confidence level when
I control for temperature. Data for temperature comes from NOAA for 1981-2008 and is based on
gauge-stations. The downside of using this data is that it could introduce bias into the model due to
measurement error (results not shown). Burke et al. (2009) find that temperature is a stronger predictor
of agricultural performance and that temperature has a stronger effect on conflict than rainfall.
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associated with conflict.38
Some of the country characteristics that are used as controls show statistically significant
results (col. 3 and 6) indicating that the odds ratio of conflict is reduced by longer
peace spells as well as non-hybrid regime types. Moreover, OLS estimation indicates
that ethnolinguistic fractionalisation is negatively associated with conflict onset at the
99 % confidence level (col. 2 and 5).
Table 2.4: Effect of rainfall on conflict onset, 1981− 2010 (Reduced form)
Rainfall measure Growth Anomaly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specifications OLS OLS RE-Logit OLS OLS RE-Logit
Rainfallt 0.01 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.69) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13)
Rainfallt−1 −0.03 −0.03 −0.49 −0.01 −0.01 −0.17
(0.02) (0.03) (0.87) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)
Peace years 0.00 −0.05*** 0.00 −0.05***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Populationt−1 (ln) −0.09 0.01 −0.09 0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Square Polity2t−1 0.00 −0.02** 0.00 −0.02**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
GDP per capita1979 (ln) 1.01 −0.28 1.11 −0.28
(1.53) (0.36) (1.56) (0.36)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization −0.97*** 0.07 −0.93*** 0.06
(0.29) (1.03) (0.31) (1.03)
Rough terrain −0.13 0.01 −0.13 0.01
(0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
Oil-exporting country −0.01 0.83 −0.02 0.83
(0.05) (0.68) (0.05) (0.69)
Country FE Yes − − Yes − −
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes − Yes Yes −
Root MSE 0.21 0.21 − 0.21 0.21 −
Conflict observations 63 55 55 63 55 55
N 1101 942 942 1101 942 942
Notes. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Estimates rounded to two decimals.
Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤
0.05, *≤ 0.1
38Note that in contrast with the studies by Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) and Fjelde and von Uexkull
(2012) which both use disaggregated data, the data in this chapter is aggregated to the country level.
50
2.5. Results 2. Economic shocks and civil conflict onset
2.5.3 Economic growth and conflict onset
Table 2.5: Effect of economic growth on conflict onset, 1981−2010 (IV−2SLS, second
stage)
Rainfall measure Growth Anomaly
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic growtht −0.48 −0.25 −1.82 1.65 0.87 0.01
(1.31) (1.60) (2.44) (1.41) (1.54) (1.23)
Economic growtht−1 −2.12* −2.16* −2.37 −1.27 −2.19 −1.31
(1.22) (1.21) (1.42) (1.32) (1.53) (1.21)
Peace years 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Populationt−1 (ln) −0.23 −0.21
(0.34) (0.22)
Square Polity2t−1 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita1979 (ln) 1.60 1.34
(5.38) (2.66)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization −1.19* −0.92**
(0.69) (0.37)
Rough terrain −0.15 −0.14
(0.12) (0.11)
Oil-exporting country 0.24 0.08
(0.27) (0.14)
Country FE − Yes − − Yes −
Country-specific time trend − Yes Yes − Yes Yes
Root MSE 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.23
Conflict observations 63 63 55 63 63 55
N 1032 1032 911 1032 1032 911
Notes. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Estimates rounded to two decimals.
Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤
0.05, *≤ 0.1
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Table 2.5 shows the results for estimating the main model using IV-2SLS with economic
growth rates predicted by variation in rainfall. For the models where economic growth
is instrumented with year-on-year growth in rainfall, the coefficient shows that a 1
percentage point drop in GDP per capita increases the risk of conflict onset in the
following year by about 2 percentage points (controlling for country fixed effects and
country specific time trends).39 The model thus predicts that there is a certain lag in
the effect of economic growth on conflict where underperformance in year t increase the
risk of the outbreak of a conflict in the following year, t+ 1. The direction of the effect
of growth at t− 1 is robust to various model specification as well as using a different
measure to capture rainfall shocks (columns 4-6). In the latter cases the results cease to
be statistically significant at the traditional levels. Using a one-sided t-test shows that
the sign of the coefficient is significant at 90% confidence level in columns 4 and 5 but
not for the model including country controls, which is similar to the results in column 3.
Additionally I find that although some of the models show a statistically significant
link between economic growth and conflict onset, these results are not robust to the
inclusion of time-fixed effects to capture shocks that are common to African countries.40
The positive sign of current growth rates in columns 4-6 is unexpected, especially
considering that this direction only occurs in the cases where I use anomalies to predict
growth. None of the country controls (col. 3 and col. 6) seem to have any predictive
power except for the variable for ethnolinguistic fractionalization which is statistically
significant in both models.41 The coefficient is significant at the 90% confidence level
and indicates that the likelihood of conflict onset actually decreases when fragmentation
increases. An explanation for this could be that when a society approaches perfect
39MSS found a point-estimate of -1.84 for lagged growth rates which wasn’t statistically significant.
In their model estimation, current growth rates were negatively linked to conflict onset and significant
at the 90% confidence level.
40Including time-fixed effects heavily inflate both the size of the coefficient as well as the standard
errors. Brückner and Ciccone (2010) also found that the results by MSS were not robust to the inclusion
of time-fixed effects.
41Something that also occurred in the reduced-form OLS regressions (see table 2.4).
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fractionalization (value of 1 in this case) people benefit more from cooperation rather
than conflict.42
Table 2.6: Effect of economic growth in different sectors on conflict onset, 1981−2010
(IV−2SLS, second stage)
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
Agricultural growtht 0.02 −0.04
(0.88) (0.58)
Agricultural growtht−1 −1.12 −0.97
(1.95) (0.99)
Industrial growtht −0.77 −0.28
(0.58) (2.73)
Industrial growtht−1 −0.43 −0.99
(0.52) (1.68)
Peace years 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Populationt−1 (ln) −0.23 −0.41
(0.25) (0.45)
Square Polity2t−1 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita1979(ln) 0.99 5.76
(2.56) (10.14)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization −0.56 −0.65
(0.69) (1.63)
Rough terrain −0.13 −0.05
(0.12) (0.10)
Oil-exporting country 0.04 0.07
(0.03) (0.08)
Country FE Yes − Yes −
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Root MSE 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23
Conflict observations 48 41 48 41
N 856 747 826 717
Notes. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Es-
timates rounded to two decimals. Robust standard errors,
clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, **
p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
42As stated in the data section, I use a different index to measure fractionalization taking into account
the political relevance of ethnic groups and allowing it to vary by decade. This might explain the
difference with the findings in the literature.
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Table 2.6 shows the results for the estimations for the effect that different economic
sectors (agricultural and industrial) have on the outbreak of conflict using rainfall
to predict the growth rates. The estimations are limited to the use of anomalies to
instrument for the growth rates as these have shown to be a stronger instrument in the
first-stage estimations. According to the literature one would expect that a positive
shock in the agricultural sector would have a larger effect on reducing conflict likelihood
compared to the industrial sector as it is more labour intensive.43 The results do not
really support this hypothesis as the estimated coefficients are very similar to the main
results. Moreover, the estimates come with a lot of uncertainty given the large standard
errors and very wide confidence intervals. On the basis of these results I can’t tell with
certainty if economic shocks in the two different sectors really have a separate effect on
conflict onset. Moreover, the coefficients are considerably lower compared to aggregate
economic output in the previous table.
As the literature suggests there is a strong link between conflict and economic conditions
but the causality may be hard to establish as conflict feeds back into the economy
influencing economic performance. To account for this feedback-loop the model is
estimated using a more stringent coding of the outcome variable. One that uses an
intermittency period after the end of a conflict in order to control for the disruptive
effect of conflict on economic performance in the mid-term. I use a 5-year intermittency
period meaning that after the last incidence of conflict I code the next 5 years as missing
in order to control for any temporal effect of conflict after the conflict ended. The results
that were statistically significant, using the standard onset-indicator, do not withstand
this test and cease to be significant (see table 2.7 for results). However, I must note
that part of this reduction in statistical significance could be due to an increase in
imprecision as the number of observations drops with about 14%. Nonetheless, there
is also a drop of almost 50% in the point estimates. Another noticeable change is the
43In terms of total employment about 44 % works in the primary sector while about 16 % works in
the secondary sector (data from WDI for Sub-Saharan Africa 1981-2010).
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direction of the effect considering the models where economic performance is predicted
by anomalies. Growth rates at t are now negatively, though statistically not significant,
related to conflict onset, confirming earlier results in the literature.
It seems that this onset-indicator does a better job in modelling the temporal dependence
of conflict and also improves the fit of the model as the mean square errors are smaller,
although not by a very large margin. Another interesting finding concerns the country
controls where the coefficient for ethnic fragmentation is statistically significant at 95%
confidence level and a coefficient size that has increased by 50%. This shows that there
is an apparent link between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and conflict onset although
not in the direction that was expected. Peace years also enters significantly in one of
the models but the point-estimate is near zero.
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Table 2.7: Effect of rainfall on conflict onset (5−year intermittency), 1981−2010
(IV−2SLS, second stage)
Rainfall measure Growth Anomaly
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic growtht −1.42 −0.92 −2.75 −0.13 −0.27 −0.33
(1.37) (1.40) (2.65) (0.99) (0.99) (0.90)
Economic growtht−1 −1.16 −1.11 −1.89 −0.48 −1.29 −0.62
(0.90) (1.03) (1.61) (0.91) (1.32) (1.12)
Peace years 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Populationt−1 (ln) −0.49 −0.25
(0.72) (0.27)
Square Polity2t−1 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita1979 (ln) 3.73 2.93
(7.01) (2.86)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization −2.12** −2.15***
(0.85) (0.41)
Rough terrain −0.29 −0.23
(0.21) (0.17)
Oil-exporting country 0.26 0.05
(0.34) (0.11)
Country FE − Yes − − Yes −
Country-specific time trend − Yes yes − Yes Yes
Root MSE 0.23 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.20 0.18
Conflict observations 34 34 29 34 34 29
N 892 892 795 892 892 795
Notes. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Estimates rounded to two decimals.
Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤
0.05, *≤ 0.1
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2.6 Conclusion
A serious challenge in the empirical literature on conflict is how to deal with the issue of
reverse causality. In a study on the effect of economic shocks and civil conflict Miguel
et al. (2004) used an innovative approach and instrumented economic performance with
year-on-year growth in rainfall and found that there is a positive link between rainfall,
economic shocks, and conflict. Their publication has become a standard work in the
literature. However, subsequent studies have failed to come to a conclusive result with
regard to the link between rainfall and conflict.
In this study I have tried to address some of the issues in the literature that haven’t
received a lot of attention. Such as the coding of the outcome variable and focussing
more on the link between rainfall and different sector of the economy, and their effect on
civil conflict probability. With regard to the coding of the outcome variable I argue that
using a binary incidence indicator does not identify the causal mechanism of interest.
Based on the theoretical contribution by Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998), the assumption
that economic shocks affect the continuation of conflict in the same way as the outbreak
of a new one is not viable. Costs associated with joining an ongoing rebellion are lower
than those associated with initiating a new one and therefore we should expect that
conflict onset is less sensitive to economic shocks (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). In my
analysis I find little support for the link between rainfall and conflict as the statistically
significant results that I find are not robust to different model specifications or different
measures of shocks. Although the analysis does show that there is some robustness
in the direction of the effect. Concerning the different economic sectors I find that
rainfall has the largest impact on the agricultural sector which is no surprise given
the dependence on rainfall for irrigation. The results also indicate that rainfall has
a statistically significant contribution to productivity in the industrial sector but the
magnitude of this effect is relatively small and the data does not seem to support some
of the strong claims made in other work (Barrios et al., 2010).
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Over the past decades the size of the agricultural sector in Africa has decreased although
it still employs a significant amount of the total labour force. There is however no
strong empirical support for the notion that a negative shock to the agricultural sector
significantly increases the risk of conflict.
A caveat with regard to estimating the relationship between rainfall, economic shocks,
and conflict is the loss of information due to aggregation when using the country-year
as unit of analysis. The yearly aggregates do not give a fair representation of within-
country differences for both rainfall and economic performance. An additional problem
is the potential mechanical error so to speak in national account data due to the lack
of institutions to correctly measure economic performance. A disaggregated approach
could be beneficial to answer some of the questions that remain although recent work
has shown that also on the local level there does not seem to be a very strong relation
between rainfall and conflict (O’Loughlin et al., 2012), something that is also established
in this study.
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Chapter 3
Food Imports, International
Prices, and Violence in Africa
3.1 Introduction
A popular discourse links the incidence of civil unrest to higher food prices, where an
increased sense of relative deprivation leads to a higher risk of violent collective action
when the staple foods become unaffordable for the masses. Although food riots have
become less common in the 20th and 21st century (see Taylor (1996) for an historical
overview), some recent events that confronted several countries with severe unrest and
political instability have been linked to food price levels (Lagi et al., 2011).
A recent example is the wave of protests, riots, and sometimes lethal violence that fol-
lowed the 2007-2008 world food price crisis. Developing countries such Haiti, Bangladesh,
the Philippines, and several African countries faced severe unrest after food prices peaked.
In a reaction to these events the director of the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) Jacques Diouf warned that the spread of violence would continue if food price
levels would not drop and expressed surprise about the fact that this issue was not on
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the United Nations Security Council’s agenda. He argued that these events showed that
higher food prices have dire consequences for peace, security, and human rights (Reuters,
2008).1 Other societal upheavals have also been linked to food prices: The recent wave
of revolutions in the Arab world, which saw political reforms, ousting of various rulers,
and in some cases culminated into civil war, followed after record high prices for major
foodstuffs such as cereals in late 2010.2 The escalation of violence in Nigeria has also
been partially linked to the price of food consumers pay as the removal of the fuel
subsidy increased local food prices due to higher transport costs (The Economist, 2012b).
Despite the anecdotal evidence, the link between food prices and incidence of vio-
lence remains speculative due to the paucity of empirical research on this subject. Only
recently academics have started to address this gap in the literature beginning with
the work by Hendrix et al. (2009) and now including studies by Arezki and Brückner
(2011), Berazneva and Lee (2013), Smith (2014), and Bellemare (2015). This study
expands the current literature by looking at the predictive power of the real level effect
of food prices on violence intensity based on a country’s food import pattern, modelled
by a country-specific food price index focussing on the effect of a specific basket of
foodstuffs. This means that in contrast to some of the existing work, I assume that
food prices for the different commodities don’t have a homogeneous effect but that
the correlation between food prices and unrest is driven by the import dependence
on predominantly the low value-added basic foodstuffs. International food prices are
used as they are a source of exogenous shocks, whereas using domestic prices could
potentially be endogenous.
1Since the 2011 meeting of the G20, food security has become a top priority on the agenda.
2Food prices might have been a tipping point with regard to the Arab Spring (The Economist, 2012a)
leading the population to express their grievances concerning government corruption and the economic
decline. A strong precedent for the Arab Spring were the Iranian 2009-2010 election protests.
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The regression analysis for 47 countries in Africa between 1990-2011 suggests that higher
fluctuations of food prices from the long term trend are associated with higher violence
levels. Moving from low to high food prices corresponds to a 0.26 increase in the log
count of violent incidents. I find that the correlation between food prices and unrest
is predominantly driven by low-value added primary products such as wheat, and the
effect is mainly associated with high-intensity types of violence. These results parallel
some of the recent findings in the literature.
This study focuses on Africa for a couple of reasons: First, as figure 3.1 illustrates, the
large majority of African countries are net-importers of food with an average share of
food imports relative to total merchandise imports of 14%.3 This makes these countries
very vulnerable to international price levels. This can be a real burden for these often
cash-strapped governments, leading to difficulties in securing an adequate level of food
security for their population and by extension in maintaining peace.4
Second, the transmission of international food prices to domestic prices leads to inflation
and will mainly hit the poor who spend a disproportionally large share of their income
on mostly basic foodstuffs (Baquedano and Liefert, 2014; Dawe and Maltsoglou, 2014;
Tadesse et al., 2013).5 Illustrated by figure 3.2, the average African consumer spends
around 50% of its disposable income on food alone. As the anecdotal evidence suggests,
when staple foods become unaffordable for a large part of the population this might
lead to violent collective action. If there is indeed a link between food prices and
civil unrest, then we should be able to observe this in African countries due to their
import dependency and large shares of consumers who live at the margin, making these
countries very vulnerable to changes in international food price levels.
3Out of a total of 53 African countries 16 (30%) are net-exporters of food. The average net-imports
of foodstuffs relative to total imports, including the net-exporters, is 7%. In 2011, in the top 20 of
countries for share of agricultural imports relative to total merchandise 15 were from Africa (FAO
Statistical Division, 2013).
4See the seminal study by Fearon and Laitin (2003) on how poverty marks weak states which favours
political instability and rebel recruitment amongst others.
5Despite the relevance of the subject there is little information on the impact of higher food prices
on the poor (Ivanic and Martin, 2008).
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Third, I use an unique dataset that covers the whole spectrum of civil unrest ranging
from strikes and protests up till civil conflict. Unfortunately, this detailed kind of data
is not readily available for other regions in the world.
The main contribution of this study is the examination of the predictive power of
food prices. So far the literature has predominantly focused on the descriptive power
of food prices in explaining past violence without paying too much attention to the
accuracies of the generated probabilities of the model. If there is indeed a strong link
between food prices and violence, then we should be able to accurately predict these
seemingly sudden outburst of unrest. Using the most recent data I attempt to predict
violence levels in Africa for 2012. Although the regression results showed that food prices
where a strong predictor for violence, I find that the model has poor predictive power
only correctly predicting 36.8% of violent events while underestimating the intensity.
The out-of-sample correct prediction rate is 11.8 percentage points better than for the
in-sample predictions. However, the improvement in accuracy is due to other factors
than food prices.
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Figure 3.1: Food imports and exports relative to total merchandise imports per
country, average for 1990-2010. Source : FAOSTAT.
Figure 3.2: Food expenditures as a share of disposable income versus GDP per capita.
The third-degree polynomial fit illustrates the decreasing trend in food expenditures as
income increases. Source : Global Food Security Index (105 countries for 2013).
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3.2 Existing literature
This study on the link between food prices and civil unrest fits within the broader
literature on food security and conflict. Examples of research within this literature
includes work on the effect of malnutrition on conflict onset (Pinstrup-Andersen and
Shimokawa, 2008), the link between U.S. food aid shipments and civil conflict incidence
(Nunn and Qian, 2014), and the causal relationship between food security and conflict
in the Arab world (Maystadt et al., 2014).6 Within this body of research there is a
small but steadily growing strand dedicated to examining the effect of food prices on
unrest. This part of the literature can be linked to the emerging literature on conflict
and commodity prices which includes a number of studies that also use international
prices as a source of exogenous shocks (Besley and Persson, 2008; Brückner and Ciccone,
2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014).
To the best of my knowledge, the first empirical study on the link between food
prices and unrest is the paper by Hendrix et al. (2009), who found for a sample of
55 major cities in Asia and Africa between 1961-2006 that international food prices
were a significant determinant of the incidence of protests and riots. This effect was
contingent on regime type though as hybrid regimes, or anocracies, were driving the
results. Their estimation is based on the effect of international wheat prices alone,
and this could potentially fail to account for substitution effects between foodstuffs
mainly different types of grains. Using global monthly data Bellemare (2015) finds
a link between international food prices and unrest, instrumenting food prices with
natural disasters. For the 1990-2011 period, he finds that increases in food price levels,
and not volatility, are the culprit of more unrest.
Similar to the work presented here, the study by Berazneva and Lee (2013) focuses
on Africa and links the occurrence of food riots with high poverty levels and higher
6There is also the work by Blaydes and Kayser (2011) who look at the effect of regime type on
calorie intake.
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levels of political restriction. Their analysis focuses only at events occurring during the
2007-2008 global food price crisis though.
The country-specific food price index used in this study is similar to the one by
Arezki and Brückner (2011). They estimate the impact of international food prices on
the quality of political institutions and intra-state conflict for 120 countries between
1970-2007. Their results show that increases in international prices correspond with
a decrease in institutional quality and increase in the incidence of anti-government
demonstration, riots, and civil conflict. The main difference with their working paper
is that this study exploits the relatively high-frequency with which data on both food
prices and violence is available, using the country-month rather than the country-year
as unit of analysis. This more disaggregated approach moves beyond the crude analysis
at the annual level and gives a better understanding of the within-year relation between
food prices and violence. This study is probably most closely related to the recent
work by Smith (2014) who looks at the effect of changes in domestic prices on urban
unrest in Africa.7 Since domestic prices are potentially endogenous he instruments
these using international prices (for wheat, rice, and corn) and estimates the effect on
urban socio-political unrest at the extensive margin. Because he uses current imports
and exports to calculate his trade balanced instrument, it is likely endogenous as these
trade flows may be determined by the incidence of unrest. In contrast, the food price
index I create is based on the trade-balance before the period in which the outcome
variable is measured. Additionally I look at a broader basket of foodstuffs in order get
an estimate of the relative importance of food import dependence, something that is
generally not addressed in the literature. Moreover, I estimate the effect of food prices
on conflict levels in order to get a better idea of the severity of the impact that food
prices can have retaining the full information of the conflict data which is often lost
when using binary measures. There is now a growing conflict literature that focuses
7The domestic prices cover a broader basket of foodstuffs that reflects local consumption but can
also include alcohol and tobacco.
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on conflict intensity, examples include Hegre et al. (2009), Costalli and Moro (2012),
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), O’Loughlin et al. (2012), Raleigh and Kniveton (2012),
and Maystadt et al. (2014).
The biggest departure of this paper relative to the current literature is the analy-
sis that I provide on the effect of food prices on violence focussing on the predicted
outcomes and using the model for out-of-sample prediction. Given the recent trends in
food prices and the events of the 2007-2008 global food price crisis, having a model with
predictive power is particularly relevant. This study therefore adds to the relatively
small literature on the prediction of political instability and civil conflict, some examples
of which include work by Goldstone et al. (2010), Weidmann and Ward (2010), Gleditsch
and Ward (2013), and recently Blair et al. (2014).
3.3 Estimation framework
The regression analysis is based on time-series cross-sectional data from 1990-2011 for
all African countries with a population of one million or more.8 The results from the
model estimation are then used to predict the outcome in 2012. Monthly data is used
for the outcome and the main explanatory variable in order to capture within-year
variability. If there is indeed a strong correlation between food prices and violence then
it is likely that this relationship can be observed in a relative short time. The outcome
variable is a count of the total number of violent events in a given country-month. The
distribution of this variable is slightly overdispersed; of the 12,372 country-months
20.7% are non-zero (µ = 0.36, σ = 0.97).9 To model the overdispersion adequately
a negative binomial (NB) model is used. (Hausman et al., 1984; Colin Cameron and
8This restriction is due to the availability of the data for the outcome variable
9The data covers 47 countries over 21 years with the exception of Eritrea which is covered from 1993.
South Sudan is not included.
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Trivedi, 1986; Allison and Waterman, 2002; Lloyd-Smith, 2007).10 In general Poisson
models are preferred when estimating a model where the outcome variable is a count,
but since the conditional mean exceeds the conditional variance such a model would fit
the data poorly as it does not account for overdispersion. The NB model is more flexible
in this respect. To account for unexplained variation over time and across countries,
country and year fixed effects are included in some of the model estimations (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008) as well as country-specific time trends. The year fixed effects also
control for any possible bias in the outcome variable as the reporting of civil unrest
in the earlier stages of the period covered might have been sparser compared to more
recent years.
The negative binomial dispersion parameter is estimated using maximum likelihood.11 A
Generalised Linear Model (GLM) is used where the outcome and explanatory variables
are linked with a standard link function (i.e. log) to the linear predictor:
η : P (Y = y | X) = µ = g(η) (3.1)
This linear predictor is a function of the country-specific food price index and the
explanatory variables:
ηct = X′β + Fctγ (3.2)
X′ is a vector of explanatory variables, fixed effects, and the intercept and Fct is the
country-specific food price index (FPI). β is a vector of coefficients associated with the
matrix of explanatory variables and γ the parameter of interest measuring the effect of
the FPI on the incidence of violence. Due to the use of time-series cross-sectional data
10The variance of the NB model is given by σ2 = µ(1 + µ/θ) where θ is the dispersion parameter
(decreasing θ correspond with higher levels of dispersion), this model allows the variance to exceed the
mean in contrast to the Poisson distribution.
11The dispersion parameter θ is estimated in R using the MASS package.
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the model might exhibit heteroskedasticity, so to asses the statistical significance of the
results, robust standard errors are used clustered at the country-level.
3.4 Data and measurement
3.4.1 Food price index
Time series data on food prices is taken from the Global Economic Monitor (GEM)
Commodities. This is a collection of monthly commodity prices of the major traded
commodities from 1960 to present (World Bank, 2013a).12 International rather than
domestic food prices are used as they are a source of exogenous variation. The literature
on price transmission shows that domestic food prices are responsive to international
food prices (Demeke et al., 2008; Minot, 2011; Verpoorten et al., 2013; Ianchovichina
et al., 2014) and can respond instantaneously (Kalkuhl, 2014). Using domestic prices
could introduce endogeneity into the model as civil unrest could also impact the level of
local food prices.13 Like most economic time-series, food prices exhibit a trend over time
which needs to be taken into account for estimating the effect as a result of real level
differences (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). To detrend the food prices I apply a penalised
splines method to estimate the trend in the data. This methods uses a Generalized
Additive Model (GAM) which accounts for the autocorrelation of the data and the error
structure, this in contrast to other more commonly used detrending methods (Claeskens
et al., 2009; Rosales and Krivobokova, 2012).14
12Since the data is given in nominal US dollars the Manufactures Unit Value Index, MUV (World
Bank, 2013b), is used to deflate and calculate real prices. Values are available from 1960 to 2009, all
later years are projections. The MUV is also used by the FAO to calculate their monthly Food Price
Index.
13Gil-Alana Alberiko and Singh (2013) found no strong evidence for the effect of violence on local
food prices in a study on Kenya. It is unclear however if this result generalizes to the whole of Africa.
14For commodity i the long-term trend between 1960-2011 is estimated and subtracted from the data.
The resulting price series is shifted upwards with a constant to avoid negative values which would distort
the country-specific price index when multiplied by negative values due to the use of net-imports.
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For each country a specific food price index is calculated based on the country’s
import pattern. The country-specific index is given as:
Fct =
N=9∑
i=1
Pitλci (3.3)
Where Pit is the price series of commodity i and λci is country’s c (fixed-weights) import
share of commodity i relative to its initial GDP. Included food commodities for the index
are limited to the main staples, such as the major cereals, sugar, and oils. These are the
dominant traded agricultural crops (Nelson et al., 2010) and make up the bulk of total
food imports as well as to account for substitution effects over time. Moreover, most
other price indices contain food items that are of little relevance to the poor (Kalkuhl,
2014). Data on food trade is taken from the FAO Statistical Division (FAO Statistical
Division, 2013).15 I use net-imports to model the wealth effect of trade, and a fixed
weight is used rather than periodic shares as short-term changes in the import pattern
could reflect socio-political conditions leading to endogeneity (Arezki and Brückner,
2011). Other studies (e.g. Hendrix et al. (2009) and Bellemare (2015)) use individual
crop prices rather than a price index, however this could potentially lead to incorrect
results as it neglects possible substitution effects, for instance between cereals.
Figure 3.3 provides a visual summary of the FPI per country and illustrates the
sometimes large variation in index values across countries.16 In order to account for
cross-country variation in levels and capture the monthly variation I follow the climate-
conflict literature and use anomalies as a measure for shocks to food prices.17 Anomalies
are measured as the monthly standardised FPI deviation from the mean for a given
country: FPIct−FPIcσc , where FPIct is the current FPI level, FPIc is the mean for
15Food imports make up between 10-25% of total merchandise imports. Cereals make up the majority
of food imports (48.7%) followed by oils and fats (15.8%), and sugars (10.4%). Included food commodities
are: barley, maize, palm oil, rice, sorghum, soybeans, soybean oil, sugar, and wheat.
16Descriptive statistics per country are provided in table B.1.
17See Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) for instance.
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country c, and σc the standard deviation of the FPI for country c.18
3.4.2 Violent events
Data for the outcome variable is taken from the Social Conflict Analysis Database,
SCAD (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2013). SCAD covers a wide range of so called social
conflict events in Africa from 1990 to 2012, and in contrast with other conflict datasets
it also includes low-intensity conflict events such as protests, riots, and inter-communal
violence. The data is media-based and human-coded with information coming from
the news wires from Agence France Press and Associated Press, containing detailed
information about the actors and location of the events for a total of around 9000 distinct
events. The focus of this study is on violent events such as riots, inter-communal violence,
and civil conflict.19 The outcome variable is the count of the number of incidents in a
country-month. Figure 3.4 illustrates per country the number of violent events relative
to the total number of events for 1990-2011.
18Figure B.2 shows this measure per country over time.
19This entails all observations coded as 3,4,7,8,9,10 for either Etype or Escalation and also includes
events from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program dataset on conflict which are included in the SCAD
dataset and coded as −9.
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Figure 3.3: Boxplot country-specific food price index for each country in the sample.
Figure 3.4: Number of total and violent social conflict events for African countries,
1990-2011. Source : SCAD 3.0.
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3.4.3 Other explanatory variables
The model includes a number of other explanatory variables to control for factors that
are commonly associated with instability and conflict.20 Most of the included variables
are based on the work by Goldstone et al. (2010) whose model for forecasting political
instability showed good predictive performance.
Civil unrest could be linked to broader issues of political neglect, poverty, and low living
standards. Therefore measures are included on income shocks, well-being, population,
and regime type.21 Gross domestic product per capita growth is included to control
for income shocks and is measured in purchasing power parity exchange rates in order
to compare across countries, the data comes from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) (World Bank, 2012). As a broader measure of well-being, compared to GDP per
capita, the natural log of the infant mortality rate is included (Goldstone et al., 2010;
O’Loughlin et al., 2012), data taken from the WDI . Both GDP per capita growth and
infant mortality rate should capture the socio-economic status of a country which is
commonly linked to the occurrence of social conflict. The natural log of total population
is included as larger populations are more difficult to control (Fearon and Laitin, 2003)
and increase food demand.22 The number of violent events in all other countries is
included as a variable in the model to account for the so called demonstration effect
(Goldstone et al., 2010) which might set a precedent making violence more likely. To
account for regime type I use the categorical measure of Goldstone et al. (2010) who
classify regimes on a 5-point scale using data from the polity IV project (Marshall et al.,
2013) on the openness of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political
participation.23 Finally, the lagged outcome variable is included in order to mitigate any
20See Hegre and Sambanis (2006); Goldstone et al. (2010)
21The data for these variables is annual and lagged by one year to control for endogeneity.
22The natural log is used due to scale differences between countries: the smallest country in the
dataset has a population around 1 million (Swaziland) whereas the largest country’s (Nigeria) population
numbers 160 million (the average population is 8.7 million).
23Data taken from Polity IV project, (Marshall et al., 2013).
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problems that could possibly arise from serial autocorrelation (Beck and Katz, 2011).
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are given in table 3.1
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics main variables
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum N
Violent unrest 0.37 0.97 0 0 15 12372
FPIσ −0.06 0.98 −0.20 -2.65 4.07 12372
Violencet−1 0.36 0.97 0 0 15 12326
ViolenceC−i 16.76 6.70 16 1 47 12372
∆ GDP per capita 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.50 0.93 11688
Infant mortality rateln 4.71 0.60 4.81 2.72 5.80 12372
Populationln 15.98 1.20 16.07 13.63 18.89 12372
Regime type 2.39 0.95 2 1 5 11196
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Preliminaries
Figure 3.5: Food prices over time plotted against the violence incidence level in each
month between 1990-2011. Source : FAO Food Price Index, GEM, and SCAD 3.0.
As a preliminary test I plot the monthly time series of violence, the country-specific
food price index, and the more generic FAO food price index (shown in 3.5). The time
series highlight that the evolution of violence and food prices are in general not very
strongly related with each other, although there are some minor trends observable across
certain sub-periods. The figure illustrates that between 1990-1998 there is a pro-cyclical
movement between the price indices and violence, a trend that also seems to manifest
itself in the years after 2010. For both the periods higher index values correspond with
higher counts of violence. An example of this is the large spike in food prices around
2010/2011 which seems to perfectly coincide with the large increase of violence around
that time.24
Interestingly, a similar spike in prices between 2007-2008 as a result of the world
24This period corresponds with the start of the Arab Spring which occurred across a number of
North-African countries.
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food price crisis does not materialise in a noticeable increase in violence levels. Food
prices and violence seem to be negatively related in the 1999-2005 period as the time
series exhibit a countercyclical movement where food prices increase but violence levels
stabilise at around 20 incidents per month.25 Although a lot of information is lost due
to the level of aggregation, this preliminary test does provide some interesting initial
insights on the link between food prices and violence showing that on average there is no
clear pattern between fluctuation in food prices and violence on the African continent.
25More so for the FAO food price index than the country-specific food price index.
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3.5.2 Main regression results
Table 3.2: Results negative binomial regression: effect of food prices on violence,
1990-2011.
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FPI 0.22 0.20 0.2 0.21 0.26
(0.10)** (0.05)*** (0.1) (0.06)*** (0.09)***
Violence(t−1) 1.29 0.35 0.7 0.41
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.1)*** (0.07)***
Violence(C−i) 0.09 −0.02
(0.09) (0.05)
∆ GDP pc. −0.2 −0.07
(0.1)* (0.08)
IMR 0.1 −1.0
(0.1) (0.6)
Population 1.4 −4
(0.2)*** (4)
Regime type 0.1 0
(0.1) (0.2)
Residual deviance 6824.8 7328.0 7401.5 5992.2 5998.3
AIC 18638 16980 15157 12671 12133
AUC 0.5381 0.6935 0.8097 0.7551 0.791
N 12326 12326 12326 10722 10722
Country FE − − Yes − Yes
Year FE − − − − Yes
Country-specific
time trend
− − Yes − −
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. FPI is
the country-specific food price index. IMR, Infant mortality rate; AIC, Akaike information
criterion; AUC, Area under curve; FE, Fixed effects.
Table 3.2 presents the main results of the effect of shocks in the country-specific Food
Price Index (henceforth FPI) on violence using negative binomial regression. Note
that throughout this study all input variables are placed on a common scale, centered
around the mean and divided by two standard deviations, in order to facilitate easier
comparison (Gelman, 2008).26
I start with a simple model (col.1) regressing the level of violence on the FPI and find
that positive fluctuations correspond with higher violence levels (e0.22 = 1.25 relative
risk ratio).27 The model has a relatively poor fit though, looking at Area Under the
26Due to the rescaling the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of moving from low to high
values.
27The log relative risk is assumed to be normally distributed.
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Curve (AUC) statistic, the model only correctly predicts violence incidence in 54%
of the observations.28 I include the lagged outcome variable to further account for
autocorrelation (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014), which drastically improves the in-sample
predictive power. The temporal lag of the outcome variable is a strong predictor for vio-
lence, significant at the 1% level and corresponding with a relative risk ratio of 3.6 (e1.29).
I change the specification to include country fixed effects and a country-specific time
trend (col.3). The country fixed effects account for time-invariant country character-
istics, such as ethnic polarisation or mountainous terrain, while the country-specific
time trends capture country-specific year shocks such as local droughts. The magni-
tude of the FPI remains stable but there is an increase in the standard error leading
the coefficient to cease being statistically significant within the traditional boundaries
(z=1.51, p-value=0.13). Despite the relatively high level of residual deviance, compared
to the other models, the descriptive power is relatively good and outperforms the model
including the country-specific explanatory variables (col.4). The preferred model (col.5)
is specified with the full set of explanatory variables, country fixed effects, and year
fixed effects to account for common time shocks. The estimation shows that higher food
prices increase the risk of violence after controlling for economic, social, and political
factors.29 Moving from low to high values on the country-specific food price index
corresponds with a 0.26 increase in the log of expected counts (the standard deviation
of the log of the outcome variable is 0.4).
Estimating the model for different time periods I don’t find any evidence for a par-
ticularly strong effect in a specific period. The regression results for sub-periods are
28As an alternative measure of significance the area under the curve (AUC) is used, which measures
the overall prediction accuracy of the model based on the effect of each variable (O’Loughlin et al.,
2012). The AUC statistic is measured on a 0-1 scale with the threshold based on the true and false
positives ratio. Values closer to one indicate a better prediction rate. Normally the AUC is used
for logit models so non-zero values are truncated to one in order to calculate the AUC statistic and
determine the predictive power of the model.
29e0.26 = 1.40 relative risk ratio
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only significant for 2005-2011.30 Past violence levels seems to be the main predictor in
the model. Including longer lags of violence in the model of up to 12 months does not
alter estimated effect of the food prices.31 The results of the preferred model are also
robust to estimations using Poisson, quasi-Poisson, and log-linear models as well as logit
and a linear probability model, using a binary outcome variable to account for possible
reporting bias.32 I run a number of robustness checks and find that the results are not
sensitive to excluding the two countries with highest violence levels from the sample
(Nigeria and South Africa), including an oil price index, including an interaction term
with landlocked countries, or accounting for food aid that might mitigate the effects
of higher food prices. The results show that besides the lagged outcome variable, the
other included variables have very little explanatory power.33
3.5.3 Different specifications of the Food Price Index
The estimation results so far have been based on shocks in the food price index based
on fluctuations in food prices from the long-term trend, weighted by the share of food
net-imports relative to fixed GDP. I now proceed making adjustments to the FPI in
order to examine the sensitivity of the results to the specific FPI construction.
I will be focussing on the price series used, included foodstuffs, and the relative weights
of the foodstuffs in order to further disentangle the link between food prices, imports,
and violence. For each different specification the FPI coefficient along with the 68%
and 95% interval are visually summarised in figure 3.6.34
30See table B.7.
31See table B.8
32See table B.9
33Considering the goodness-of-fit of the model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) shows that
the inclusion of fixed effects leads to lower AIC values which indicate a better fit. The dispersion
parameter θ is larger than one (1.56) indicating that the data is not highly overdispersed and the use of
a negative binomial regression is sufficient (Lloyd-Smith, 2007). The ratio of deviance versus degrees of
freedom (0.92) also indicates that the model is a good fit (Allison and Waterman, 2002).
34Results for estimated coefficients and models statistics are given in table B.11
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The reason for using detrended prices is to account for the trend in food series which
allows us to estimate the real level effect. However, the trend in the data might actually
matter with regard to violence intensity and therefore I re-estimate the model using
nominal and real food prices. The results show that there are some differences where
the estimated magnitude for nominal and real prices is about 1.3 to 1.4 times larger
than that of detrended prices. Using average net-imports of food relative to GDP for
1990-2011 leads to a 16% decrease in the coefficient size. Using an average weight might
account better for shifts in consumption over time compared to a fixed weight, but is
also likely endogenous. This coefficient should be therefore interpreted as a sort of lower
bound. In this case the relative risk ratio of food price changes is 1.25 (e0.22).
Estimating the model using a FPI constructed using only the trade balance gives almost
identical results to the main index. Similar to the instrument used by Smith (2014) I
Figure 3.6: Estimates, 68% intervals, and 95% intervals for the food price index
coefficient according to different specifications.
construct a price index using only the main cereals: wheat, rice, and maize. Although
in this case the net-imports are fixed and relative to GDP in the period before the
outcome variable is measured. The results cease to be statistically significant, while
also showing a decrease in coefficient size. Focussing only on the impact of wheat prices
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as Hendrix et al. (2009), do produce a statistically significant coefficient and seems
to indicate that shocks in global wheat prices indeed explain some of the observed
violence. This partially counters the point I made in the introduction that there could
be a potential bias due to unaccounted substitution effects. Although relative to the
measures that include the full basket of foodstuffs, it only outperforms the measure that
isn’t trade-balanced (i.e. only accounting for whether a country imports a particular
commodity).35
Out of all the food price indices, the generic food price index produces the small-
est point estimate accompanied by a large standard error. The explanatory power of
this variable is extremely low compared to the other measures. This is potentially due
to the fact that it includes foodstuffs which aren’t relevant to African countries. In
general these results show that the effect of food prices on violence is likely driven by a
specific basket of foodstuffs.
3.5.4 In-sample predictive power
The main results and various robustness checks show that in general there seems to be
a link between food prices and violence levels. However, we should be cautious relying
too much on p-values for determining the strength of a particular model (Ward et al.,
2010). To assess the in-sample predictive power I re-estimate the model omitting one
variable at a time and measure the change in the AUC statistic, the results for which
are shown in figure 3.7.
The figure illustrates that the main predictor for violence is past violence levels, whereas
for instance the inclusion of infant mortality rate actually slightly decreases the predic-
tive power of the model. Following the best fit regression line through 0 the predictive
power of regime type and population is about where we would expect it to be, based on
35The explanatory power of this measure is similar to the measure only including the main cereals.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of statistical significance (absolute z-value) vs. predictive
power of the variable (∆AUC), based on model in table 4.1 column 5.
their level of statistical significance. In that respect, although the regression analysis
showed that the FPI was a relatively strong predictor of violence based on the magnitude
of the coefficient, this doesn’t translate into improvements in the model accuracy. To
get a better understanding of the model’s predictive behaviour I examine the generated
predicted outcomes, setting the threshold at 1 to distinguish between predicted events
and non-events. Out of the total of 1,969 non-zero observations in the data, the model
correctly predicts the incidence of violence in 500 cases which corresponds with a 25%
correct prediction rate. This leaves a total of 1,469 false negatives while also generating
184 false positives, the distribution across countries of which is shown in figure 3.8. The
figure illustrates that the false positives are almost exclusively generated for countries
with high levels of violence prevalence (see fig 3.4) whereas the false negatives cover
a wider range of countries. In general the results seem to indicate that the model is
able to identify violence in countries with high levels of violence on average but less
able to correctly identify specific episodes of violence. This would imply that the effect
of food prices is larger in countries like South Africa, which actually has a negative
FPI, compared to a country like Senegal which is arguably more exposed to higher food
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prices due to its large food imports.36
Figure 3.8: Distribution across countries of generated false positives (top) and false
negatives (bottom) for in-sample predictions.
36For the false negatives the average shock to the FPI is 0.35 (median is 0.28).
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Focussing on the intensive margin, figure 3.9 plots the predicted outcome levels along
the observed violence levels which are ordered from low to high where the red line
through the plot indicates the true level of the outcome variable. Although in general
the model is under-predicting the incidence of violence, it is over-predicting violence
in particular countries as illustrated by the figures, both the incidence of violence as
well as the intensity of the violence in a country-month. Again, most of these countries
appear in the top 5 of violent events. The corresponding shocks to the FPI for these
observations are above average with an average value of 0.46 (median 0.62).
Figure 3.9: Predicted values generated by the model ordered along the observed
violence levels from low to thigh, where the red line indicates the real level of violence.
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3.5.5 Out-of-sample predictions
I now turn the attention to actual prediction for out-of-sample data using data from
2012, constructing a dataset with 540 observations including 171 cases of violence.37
One possible exception to my earlier comment that most studies don’t pay attention
to prediction is the work by Lagi et al. (2011). In their paper they extrapolated the
FAO food price index and, based on the increase in the index value, argued that at
current prices mid-2012 would be likely point of instability. Figure 3.10 extends an
earlier figure (figure 3.5) to include the data on violence and the FPI for 2012 and shows
that there indeed seems to be some pro-cyclical movement in both time-series.38 It
would therefore be interesting to see if this trend continues and if food prices can be of
value in predicting violence levels. Generating the predicted outcomes using the main
model correctly predicts the incidence of violence in 48 observations which leaves 88
false negatives. It seems that the correct predictions have little to do with shocks to the
FPI as the average value is negative (−0.18). The in-sample predicted outcomes showed
that in general the model was over-predicting the incidence of violence for particular
countries and in general over-predicting the intensity of events. The over-prediction
of intensity levels has decreased quite sharply. For instance the maximum predicted
intensity if just 9.8 versus the actual observed level of 19 (figure 3.12). A positive
development is the decrease in the over-prediction for particular countries: the model
generates just 8 false positives (7 in Democratic Republic of the Congo and 1 in South
Africa, see figure 3.11).
These results are based on the main model which has the FPI specified using de-
trended prices while in contrast the prediction by Lagi et al. (2011) was done using
nominal prices. As a robustness check I therefore use the FPI constructed with nominal
37Due to missing values 36 observations are omitted leaving 504 observations with 136 cases of
violence.
38The regression analysis results also produced significant results for the estimated effect of food
prices on violence in the past 6 years.
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prices to generate the predicted outcomes and find that nominal prices perform similarly.
The model only generates 1 false positives, but also has less correct predictions with 41
(leaving 95 false negatives). For the main dataset I showed that the predictive power
of the FPI was relatively low and this issue seems to be exacerbated for out-of-sample
data. Using a baseline model only omitting the FPI variable I find more or less the
same predictions as the main model: 50 correct predictions, leaving 86 false negatives
(10 false positives). This illustrates that, at least for 2012, food prices are of little use
in trying to predict civil unrest.
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Figure 3.10: Food price index and number of violent events extended to 2012.
Figure 3.11: Predicted values generated by the model ordered along the observed
violence levels from low to thigh, where the red line indicates the real level of violence.
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Figure 3.12: Distribution across countries of generated false positives (top) and false
negatives (bottom)for out-of-sample predictions.
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3.6 Conclusion
Despite the social relevance of the subject there is still relatively little known about the
impact of higher food prices on the poor in the general and on civil unrest in particular,
although there has been an increase in research on the subject. Anecdotal evidence
on food riots provides some support for the claim of a link between higher food prices
and civil unrest, as a scenario occurs where higher food prices create a greater sense of
relative deprivation, leading to grievances among the population which could culminate
into violence. The empirical research so far has tried to examine this mechanism and
found some proof for the claim that higher food prices are associated with an increase
in unrest and instability.
Using the latest data I re-examine this claim applying a new method to account for the
trend in food prices and construct a food price index based on a country’s food import
pattern to correctly model the effect of real level differences in food price levels. The
regression analysis shows that higher food prices correspond with higher violence levels,
an effect robust to different model specifications as well as estimation methods. The
results also show that relations seem to be driven mainly by the prices of basic staples
(mainly wheat). The magnitude of the effect is relatively low though and despite the
statistically significant results I also find that food prices have very little predictive
power both for in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. Using data for 2012 I find
that the inclusion of food prices in the model is of little relevance to the predictive
performance which casts some doubts on the claim of a link between food prices and
civil unrest.
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Chapter 4
A spatial analysis of the effect of
foreign aid in conflict areas
4.1 Introduction
Annually billions of dollars of foreign aid flow from developed to developing countries
with the aim to reduce malnutrition, poverty, and increase stability. Concerning political
stability, the empirical literature on aid and conflict has produced diverging results
with no consensus on the direction of the effect. This might not be surprising given the
mixed results on the effectiveness of foreign aid in general (Roodman, 2007; Easterly
and Pfutze, 2008; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008, 2011).
In this study I do not aim to address the whole debate on foreign aid effectiveness, but
rather zero in on the aid-conflict nexus focussing on effects at the sub-national level.
This nexus has been studied in the quantitative literature predominantly using the
country-year as unit of analysis. Due to this level of aggregation, useful information on
the dynamics of aid and conflict is potentially lost as most aid projects are targeted at
local development (Findley et al., 2011; Berman et al., 2013) and conflict tends to be
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highly localised (Raleigh et al., 2010). It is therefore straightforward to see that a more
disaggregated approach, that takes into account the local dynamics, could improve our
understanding of how aid influences conflict.
There are some examples of recent research that take this approach. These include
the study by Berman et al. (2013) on Iraq, Tahir (2015) on Pakistan, and work by
Arcand and Labonne (2011) and Crost et al. (2014) on the Philippines as well as the
paper by Strandow et al. (2014) that also focuses on Africa. Most of these studies
focus on particular conflicts in specific countries which makes their results hard to
generalise. This study extends the current literature by providing a cross-country study
in which the analysis is focussed on the sub-national level. More specifically I examine
the link between foreign aid allocations and conflict intensity in three African countries
(Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan) between 1999-2008. I estimate
the effect at the provincial and district level based on data from a unique dataset on
local aid allocations using Bayesian estimation to produce consistent estimates in the
presence of spatial autocorrelation. This work is most similar to that of Strandow et al.
(2014), the main difference is that their work focuses on the effect of aid distribution in
contested areas whereas I examine the more general effect of aid allocations on conflict.
This study also adds to the growing literature on conflict intensity which includes
work by Hegre et al. (2009), Costalli and Moro (2012), Hendrix and Salehyan (2012),
O’Loughlin et al. (2012), Raleigh and Kniveton (2012), and Maystadt et al. (2014).
Focussing on conflict intensity allows us to get better insights in conflict dynamics as
we keep the full information of the conflict data, this in contrast with the commonly
used cruder binary measures.
The statistical analysis shows that there is little evidence for a particular strong
link between aid and conflict. Pushing the results hard I find that at the extremes
moving from low to high changes in aid corresponds with 0.2% decrease in conflict
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intensity. This negative link between aid and conflict is stronger for non-fungible aid
compared to fungible aid which likely has no effect in this sample. Given the data
availability on aid, which only maps commitments and not disbursements, I am however
cautious with drawing too strong conclusions about the causal mechanisms. In the
model the strongest predictor for changes in conflict intensity are past changes which
correspond negatively with current changes in conflict intensity. This results shows that
high intensity conflict events in general are not persistent over time. Considering the
spatial effects of conflict the results show that conflict tends to be highly localised and
that there is a some risk of contagion across districts but not provinces.
4.2 Existing literature
There is a large schism in the literature concerning the effect of foreign aid on conflict
dynamics, specifically the direction of the effect. Theoretically, the perceived positive
link between aid and conflict is channelled through rent-seeking behaviour and the
potential shift in the domestic power balance as a result of aid allocations.1
One strand of the literature argues that aid flows are beneficial and might improve
stability. Aid money can be used for social spending which potentially reduces grievances
the population might have versus the government. It also increases opportunity costs
of conflict, making it more difficult to recruit insurgents, and additionally aid money
could be diverted to increase military expenditures which provides a strong deterrent
(Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002, 2007). In all these cases foreign aid will bolster government
capacity and reduce conflict risk, an effect for which Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) offers
three routes.
In the direct route i) aid augments the government budget and relaxes budget constrains
1An important concept in this regard is the issue of state capacity as described by Fearon and Laitin
(2003) who argue that bureaucratically weak states have an increased risk for insurgency. See Petřík
(2008) for an overview on the literature on the role of development assistance in ongoing conflicts and
its influence on violent tensions during times of peace.
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while indirectly ii) aid affects economic growth (although this is heavily debated) and iii)
diversifies the economy making it less dependent on primary commodities. According
to Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) these three factors combined make conflict less likely as a
result of foreign aid flows.
de Ree and Nillesen (2009) provide empirical evidence for the direct channel, where aid
relaxes the budget constraints. They find that higher levels of foreign aid are correlated
with a reduction in conflict duration, possibly due to increased government capacity
according to the authors.2 In similar vein, Savun and Tirone (2011) show that stability
improves in countries during a democratic transition when receiving foreign development
assistance. So called democracy aid helps reduce the commitment problems of the
government that occur during this democratisation process as the authority of the
central government weakens and uncertainty increases. Subsequently the likelihood of
conflict decreases due to this democracy aid.
In contrast, the other strand of the literature is more negative in tone and argues
that aid increases conflict risk. In a seminal paper, Grossman (1992) describes how the
insurgents’ objective is to capture the state for financial advantages. More aid will make
this objective more lucrative and thus increase incentives, something also echoed by
Addison and Murshed (2001). The empirical proof for this hypothesis is based mainly
on the uncertainty or volatility in aid flows. For example Arcand and Chauvet (2001)
find that although aid can have a stabilizing effect, the uncertainty of aid flows will
actually increase conflict likelihood. Aid flow volatility leads to higher uncertainty
levels which fosters instability. In turn, large negative shocks will lead to a shift in the
domestic power balance which increases conflict likelihood as shown by Nielsen et al.
(2011). Focussing on state capacity, Djankov et al. (2008) find that negative aid shocks
can lead to a deterioration in institutional quality. They also find that the magnitude
of the effect of aid rents is larger compared to that of natural resources such as oil.
2They are unable to establish a causal link however.
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Besides this volatility, there are other parallels between natural resources and foreign
aid. For instance local aid allocations, like humanitarian aid, provide a lootable resource
similar to natural resources. Aid can be appropriated by insurgents (Blouin and Pal-
lage, 2008) in order to supplement their income or help support their operations, both
of which will potentially increase conflict duration (Findley et al., 2011). Anecdotal
evidence includes the theft by al-Shabaab in Southern Somalia of about $500,000 worth
of humanitarian materials and supplies between late 2011 and early 2012 (Department
for International Development, 2013). Similarly Nunn and Qian (2014) find in a study
on the effect of U.S food aid on conflict that increases in food aid correspond with
increases in both the incidence and duration of civil conflict.3
There are a number of papers that have tried to disentangle the relation between
aid and conflict at the local level.4 Berman et al. (2013) look at the effect of per district
development spending by the U.S. military in Iraq and find that aid potentially reduces
violence. This effect mainly occurs in district with small aid projects (below $50,000)
combined with high levels of troop strength, and the availability of development exper-
tise. This paper provides an interesting insight in the effect of aid spending in a conflict
situation, highlighting some of the factors required for aid to have a beneficial impact
on the local community. Two other examples focus on the effect of local development
programmes in the Philippines. Arcand and Labonne (2011) use a rent-seeking model
for conflict and show that between 2003-2006 increases in the intensity of violence
around aid projects are related to the insurgents’ ideology and not just an effect of the
level of aid itself. Similarly Crost et al. (2014) examine the effect of a large development
programme on conflict intensity between 2002-2009 and find that municipalities that
are barely eligible for receiving aid from this programme experience large increases in
3This effect tends to be more pronounced in countries with a recent spell of conflict. Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2002) argue that food aid is the only type of aid that can be appropriated by insurgents during
a conflict.
4Böhnke and Zurcher (2013) study the impact of aid on perceived security in Afghanistan and is
therefore not directly comparable with the other works discussed here or this paper in general.
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fatalities as the authors argue the insurgents try to sabotage the project. Focussing
on Pakistan, Tahir (2015) finds that aid increases conflict risk as it erodes the fiscal
capacity of the state.
Most similar to this study is the work by Strandow et al. (2014) who examine the effect
of aid distribution in contested areas during ongoing wars in Sub-Sahara Africa. They
find that concentrated aid increases the likelihood of conflict.
From the literature the following mechanism emerge, linking foreign aid and con-
flict (as discussed in Findley et al. (2011)) that is of interest to this study. Larger aid
flows will increase the prize associated with capturing the state, an effect that provides
rent-seeking opportunities which increases the risk of insurgency. However, simultane-
ously higher aid levels potentially decrease conflict risk as it improves state capacity.
Following this mechanism, in the local context we would expect to observe more conflict
in remote regions of the country. In these peripheral areas at a distance from the capital
the central government has arguably less authority and is also less visible compared to
regions closer to the seat of power. Considering the effect of local development projects
we would expect that higher levels of regional aid allocations intensify conflict as it has
the potential to weaken insurgents on the long term as local economic development
increases opportunity costs and popular support for the government (Crost et al., 2014).
Additionally, since aid is a resource that can be appropriated it potentially provides
incentives for conflict at the local level as well. Aid appropriation can become a key
objective for local insurgents in order to supplement income and accordingly, at the
local level, we would expect to observe regions where aid and conflict tends to cluster.
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4.3 Data and measurement
First and second level administrative divisions are used as unit of analysis as they
capture the social heterogeneity that follows sub-national boundaries (Østby et al., 2009;
Aas Rustad et al., 2011).5 I use two different levels as the statistical results could be
driven by the level of aggregation as a result of modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP)
(Gehlke and Biehl, 1934; Openshaw, 1983; Fotheringham and Wong, 1991) and also to
account for possible displacement effects (Maystadt et al., 2014).
4.3.1 Foreign aid
Measurements on local foreign aid allocations are taken from the UCDP/AidData
dataset constructed by Findley et al. (2011) which includes detailed information on the
location of aid projects for the period 1989-2008 and is currently the most comprehensive
geocoded aid dataset available.6 This dataset is based on AidData (Tierney et al.,
2011) which contains detailed information on development finance (loans or grants)
allocated to developing countries with the intend to promote economic development. It
includes data on finance by governments, official government aid agencies, and inter-
governmental organisations but not from non-governmental organisations, the private
sector or military assistance. The information in the dataset is compiled from a wide
range of sources such as annual donor reports and project documents from bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies as described in Tierney et al. (2011).
For each region aid allocations, measured in constant U.S. dollars, are aggregated
to region-year level and lagged by one year.7 The lag is taken for two reasons.
One is to account for simultaneity bias as aid commitments could be the results of
5Data source: GADM database of Global Administrative Areas v.2.0 (GADM, 2012). First and
second level administrative divisions correspond with provinces and districts respectively.
6See also Strandow et al. (2011).
7To account for scale differences, the natural log is taken.
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donors’ reaction to violence levels (de Ree and Nillesen, 2009). Donors could decide to
increase aid commitment to an area experiencing conflict to help reduce the adverse
effects of violence or reduce commitments as risk mitigation. However, it is very unlikely
that donors are able to anticipate conflict as there is very little known about how aid,
and donors behaviours, influences conflict (Strandow et al., 2014).8
Second, a shortcoming of the dataset is that it only contains information on commit-
ments and does not track disbursements.9 To deal, at least partially, with this problem
the aid commitments are lagged since there is likely a delay between commitments and
the actual disbursement in the intended region. This also implies another constraint
concerning the estimation of the effect of aid on conflict. Due to the absence of in-
formation on disbursements I can’t account for longer delays than one year between
aid commitments and disbursements or for cases where there is not a one to one re-
lation between commitments and disbursements. This means that ultimately I rely
on the assumption that aid commitments will have short term effects on conflict intensity.
Although this is the most comprehensive dataset available it is unclear, and also
impossible to know, whether it includes the total number of aid projects.10
An inspection on data availability shows that potentially missing data might not be
random in terms of temporal coverage. The number of aid projects per year in the
earlier year (1989-1997) is considerably lower (only 16% of the total) compared to the
later period from 1998 onwards. A more serious source of bias is the country selection.
Only Sub-Saharan African countries with conflict between 1989-2008 are sampled, and
predominantly conflict-years are included. This leads to gaps in data availability as
shown in figure 4.1. To account for these problems I focus the analysis on the period
with relatively good coverage (1999-2008) and only include countries that have no gaps
8Additionally Strandow et al. (2014) argue that in the unlikely case that donors do anticipate
conflict, this will probably lead to an increase in variation in aid commitments meaning that there is no
systematic effect across donors and aid types that biases the results.
9This data is not available.
10This is also acknowledged by Strandow et al. (2014).
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in their records. I therefore limit the sample to 3 countries: the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Sudan. These three are included as they are roughly
comparable in size, also in terms of the sub-national administrative units, and addition-
ally have substantial within-country variation in both conflict levels and aid allocation.11
Figure 4.1: Overview of the coverage of aid allocations per country for the period
1989-2008. Darker shades indicate a higher number of aid projects included for the
corresponding country-year. Sources : UCDP/AidData, Findley et al. (2011).
4.3.2 Civil conflict
Data for the outcome variable is taken from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
v.1.5-2011 (Sundberg et al., 2010; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). This is the most
accurate geocoded dataset on conflict available (Eck, 2012). An additional advantage
is that it uses the same geocoding methodology as the aid dataset (Strandow et al.,
11For these reasons I do not include Uganda and Burundi as they are not comparable in size at
national and sub-national level.
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2011).12
A conflict event is defined as "a phenomenon of lethal violence occurring at a given time
and place" and each event is given as a point with longitude and latitude coordinates,
time of occurrence, and the number of fatalities. This point data is aggregated to
the regional level to create the conflict measure: the total number of fatalities in a year.13
Conflict at the local level might exhibit particular spatial patterns which leads to
spatial autocorrelation in the outcome variable.14 This means that the observed value
for conflict intensity in region i could depend on conflict levels in nearby regions, rather
than only the covariates in region i itself. To account for this interdependence a spatial
lag of outcome variable W is included in the model. This spatial lag is a spatially
weighted conflict measure based on conflict intensity in the k neighbouring regions of i.
W is calculated using a binary spatial weights matrix based on first order contiguity,
i.e. only including the direct neighbours of i.15 The spatial weights matrix is not
row-standardised as row-standardisation would imply that the influence of region j on i
decreases when the number of neighbours increases. This would entail that the effect
of conflict in neighbouring areas is larger when a region has relatively few neighbours
which is not theoretically justifiable in this case.16
12This ensures that the precision of the two datasets is identical, in contrast with other available
datasets where the precision of the geocoding is less clear, and thus facilitates accurate matching.
13As a robustness check the model is also estimated using a binary indicator for conflict incidence.
This indicator takes value 1 if there is a conflict in region i at time t and 0 otherwise.
14This could mean diffusion where conflict in region i could spread uniformly to other regions in the
geographic space or clustering where region i and its k neighbours have very similar levels of conflict.
Spatial autocorrelation is similar to temporal autocorrelation with the main difference that spatial
autocorrelation can move in either direction.
15Direct neighbours irrespective of national borders. Contiguity is used rather than a distance based
measure because of the variability in size of the regions.
16Note that according to LeSage and Pace (2010) the estimates and inferences from the regression
model should not be sensitive to particular specifications of the spatial weights structure.
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4.3.3 Other explanatory variables
In some model specifications a number of additional explanatory variables are included
to account for specific factors that could be linked to civil conflict.
I include regional total population with yearly data derived from the Gridded Population
of the World v.3 dataset (CIESIN, 2004). Local income shocks are linked to conflict
(Hodler and Raschky, 2014b), but since comparable income data at the sub-national
level for developing countries is almost non-existent I follow Henderson et al. (2012),
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015), Hodler and Raschky (2014a), and Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2014) by using satellite night light density data as a proxy for economic
activity. Data is taken from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
Earth Observation Group. Some recent studies have provided empirical evidence for a
link between ethnic heterogeneity and the prevalence of conflict (Cederman and Girardin,
2007; Weidmann, 2009; Kuhn and Weidmann, 2013), therefore a ethnic polarisation
measure (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) is included, data taken from
the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010). Similarly, total population (Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006) and lootable resources (Ross, 2004, 2006; Lujala et al., 2005) are linked
to conflict. Natural resources are accounted for by a dummy indicating the presence
of oil or diamonds.17 Finally, as a proxy for government capacity the natural log of
the distance from the national capital is included as peripheral areas far from the
capital could be more likely to experience conflict as government power is weak in these
regions.18
17Data source: Gilmore et al. (2005) for diamonds and PRIO Petroleum Dataset v.1.2 for oil (Lujala
et al., 2007)
18The distance is measured in kilometres from the centroid of the administrative division.
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4.4 Estimation framework
The effect of foreign aid on conflict is estimated using Bayesian regression which has the
advantage of producing consistent estimates in the presence of spatial interdependence
(LeSage, 2000). This in contrast with classic methods like OLS, used by Berman et al.
(2013) and Crost et al. (2014)), which suffers from omitted variable bias if the spatial
structure is not modelled, or simultaneity bias when the spatial lag is included as the
errors are no longer independent. To identify the effect of aid on conflict I use the same
approach as Berman et al. (2013) and use a first-differences design. I regress changes in
conflict levels on changes in lagged aid allocations controlling for changes in conflict
in neighbouring areas and lagged changes in conflict as given in the following model
specification (Eq.1):
∆Cit = ρ∆
∑
k
WiktCkt + β∆Cit−1 + γ∆Ait−1 + θt (4.1)
Outcome variable Cit is the change in the log count of the number of fatalities in region
i at time t. The sign and strength of the interdependence in the outcome variable
is estimated by ρ∑kWiktCkt, where W is the autoregressive term and ρ the spatial
autoregressive parameter.19
The temporal lag of the outcome variable is included as in the model as this effectively
captures common trends and accounts for temporal dynamics (Plümper and Neumayer,
2010). Year indicators (θt) are included in the model to account for common shocks. γ
represents the effect of changes in aid levels on changes in conflict intensity.
19The inclusion of the spatial lag controls for contemporaneous correlation in the outcome variable
and allows me to estimate the sign and strength of the correlation. I refer to the work by Beck et al.
(2006); Plümper and Neumayer (2010); Franzese and Hays (2007) for an extensive overview of model
specification in the presence of interdependence. Annex B presents results for the Moran’s I test for
autocorrelation which establishes that there is spatial autocorrelation in the outcome variable.
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Although less informative, I also consider changes on the extensive margin using
a conflict onset indicator and estimating the model with logit as a robustness check.
The conflict onset measure is a binary indicator for region i in year t which equals 1 if
there is a conflict in year t but not in year t− 1 and 0 if there is no conflict in both year
t and t− 1. If there is a conflict in year t− 1 then the indicator is not defined for t.
To estimate the effect I use a multilevel model similar to the one used by Danneman and
Ritter (2013). The advantage of using a multilevel model is the ease with which it can
handle the time-series cross-sectional structure of the data and account for differences
across the units of analysis (Gelman and Hill, 2006).20 I use the following estimation
framework:
Cit = αi + ρ
∑
k
WiktCkt + βCit−1 + γAidit−1 + θt (4.2)
αi = α0 + ηi (4.3)
Where ηi ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and X is a vector with other explanatory variables. The model
is estimated using a partial pooling procedure which means that intercept αi is an
outcome in the model, where α0 represents the average intercept across the regions and
ηi is the unique effect of region i on α which is assumed to be a random shock from the
normal distribution (Shor et al., 2007).
The models are estimated using a Gibbs sampler, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm, in order to construct the posterior distribution for the parameters
from which the coefficients and their uncertainty interval are calculated.21 Parameters
20The unit of analysis, the region-year, is nested within the regions so the data has a clustered
structure with two levels or hierarchies: the regional level and the time component. The multilevel
model recognises the existence of this hierarchy by allowing residual components at each level in the
hierarchy.
For a more extensive theoretical elaboration on the use of Bayesian multilevel models with time-series
cross-sectional data I refer to Shor et al. (2007).
21JAGS is used for the Gibbs sampler (Plummer, 2014).
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in the model, such as γ and ρ, are modelled using vague or non-informative priors
with distribution N(0, 10) (Gelman et al., 1995).22 To construct the parameters I run
3 parallel MCMC chains each with 40,000 iterations with the thinning rate set at 5
in order to account for the autocorrelation in the chains. For each of the chains the
first 10,000 iterations are discarded as burn-in in order to have some more certainty
that the coefficient estimates are taken from the posterior distribution (Brooks and
Gelman, 1998; Brooks et al., 2011). The coefficients and their uncertainty intervals are
constructed as averages across the remaining iterations (18,000 in this case).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Preliminaries
Figure 4.2 shows the spatial distribution of aid allocations (aggregated to 0.5 degree
grid cells, larger circles correspond with larger aid flows) and civil conflicts (individual
events) for the three sampled countries covering the period 1999-2008 (the black diamond
indicates the national capital). Large aid allocations are concentrated around the capital
of DRC, Darfur and South Sudan in Sudan, and the central region of Ethiopia. In
contrast, conflict tends to be highly localised in DRC’s Kivu region, Somali in Ethiopia,
and Darfur in Sudan. In general the data does not seem to show a high degree of
overlap between aid and conflicts, save for a few regions such as Darfur and Kivu.
22These priors should add nothing to the analysis and not influence the posterior. As a result of using
non-informative priors the estimated coefficients will be similar to maximum likelihood estimation.
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As a preliminary test I examine the spatial patterns in aid and conflict using the
non-aggregated data, retaining all the information there is on location. Based on the
results in the literature we would expect to observe conflict at distance from the capital
and close to aid sources.
Figure 4.3 maps the location of aid and conflict relative to the capital, where larger
circles represent larger aid flows or higher conflict intensity. It illustrates that conflict
tends to occur relatively far away from the capital, but aid in general is allocated
closer to the capital. On average the distance between the capital and conflict is about
1000 Km (1016 Km ± 492 Km) which is relatively large. Since this number is an
average across the three countries, I account for the size of each country standardizing
the distance dividing it by the distance between the capital and the furthest point
in the country relative to the capital.23 I find that for both DRC and Sudan con-
flicts occur at large distances from the capital, with average ratios of 0.72 and 0.70
respectively. This could mean that for these two countries the central government
has difficulties in controlling the peripheral areas or that the government is stronger
in the central areas pushing conflict to these other areas. For Ethiopia the average
ratio is considerably smaller at 0.44 which could be explained by the fact the Addis
Abeba is located much more central compared to Kinshasa and Khartoum. For for-
eign aid the distance ratios are smaller at 0.50 (DRC), 0.31 (Ethiopia), and 0.55 (Sudan).
The data suggests that aid is mainly allocated in the central areas whereas conflict
tends to occur in the peripheral areas. There are a number of possible explanations
for this pattern. It could be, as suggested by the literature, that aid strengthens the
position of the government. Aid projects will foster local development which increases
the opportunity costs of insurgency. In the peripheral areas there are less aid projects
meaning that these regions lag in their economic development and are therefore more
23D¯capital→conflict/maxDcapital. maxDcapital is 1945 Km for DRC, 1035 Km for Ethiopia, and 1364
Km for Sudan.
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likely to harbour insurgencies. Additionally, aid donors could be risk averse and allo-
cate money to locations where the government is relatively strong again depriving the
peripheral areas from aid.
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To test whether aid and conflict cluster in localised areas I examine the interdependence
between observations measured by the Nearest Neighbour Distance (NND).24 The NND
is calculated as the distance between an aid project and the nearest conflict event
for each year between 1999-2008, where the aid allocations are lagged by one year to
account for simultaneity. The results are presented in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Density of nearest neighbour distance between conflict and aid. Solid
vertical line indicates the mean value, dotted vertical line indicates median value.
24I also examine the intensity of the number of aid and conflict observations using the kernel density.
Results for which are briefly discussed in the appendix C.
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If aid provides incentives for conflict, because it is a prize that can be appropriated or
the subject of sabotage, then we would expect that the distance between aid and conflict
is small. Smaller distances correspond with stronger interdependence, but as illustrated
by the figure in general there is a large spread in distances and interdependence appears
to be weak. The mean NND is 218 Km and median NND is 141 Km. These are relatively
large distances compared to the NND values for aid and conflict separately where the
average distance between observations is around 100 Km.25
For 27% of the observations (435 cases out of a 1651 observations) the distance between an
aid project and conflict is below 50 Km.26 This indicates some stronger interdependence
and provides some support for the notion that aid might provide incentives for conflict
in some individual cases. This corresponds with some of the results found by Strandow
et al. (2014) where aid distributed to areas which were contested increases the likelihood
of violent armed conflict.
4.5.2 Regression results
Table 4.1 presents the estimated coefficients along with their 95% interval (in paren-
theses) at both levels of aggregation.27 Since the input variables are all placed on a
common scale centered around the mean and divided by two standard deviations, in
order to facilitate easier comparison, they can be interpreted as the effect of moving
from low to high values (Gelman, 2008).28
Model 1 is the preferred model and specified according to Eq.1. Some results in
the literature (Arcand and Labonne, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2011; Crost et al., 2014) show
25Adjusting the sample to only include observations with the highest level of precision in geocoding
does not alter these figures much: mean NND=257 Km, median NND=150 Km. The NND for the full
sample is 110 Km and 98 Km for conflict and aid respectively. See also see figure C.9.
2624% (275 out of 1135 observations) using the sample with higher precision levels.
27All models converged based on a visual inspection of the traceplots for the parameters of interest
and the values for the Rˆ statistic which was below the 1.05 threshold in all cases.
28The dummy for natural resources was also standardised because the input was skewed.
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Table 4.1: Predicting changes in conflict intensity
Province level (N=203 ) District level (N=952 )
Specifications Model 1 Gov. Sector Model 1 Gov. Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign aid −0.2 −0.2 0.01 0.01
(−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.17; 0.19) (−0.17; 0.19)
Foreign aid
to government 0.2 −0.1
(−0.4; 0.8) (−0.3; 0.1)
Fungible aid 0 0.02
(−0.5; 0.5) (−0.16; 0.20)
Non-fungible aid −0.5 −0.07
(−1.0; 0) (−0.25; 0.11)
Spatial lag −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 0.12 0.13 0.11
(−0.7; 0.2) (−0.7; 0.2) (−0.7; 0.4) (−0.06; 0.29) (−0.05; 0.30) (−0.07; 0.29)
Temporal lag −1.4 −1.4 −1.4 −1.32 −1.32 −1.31
(−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9; −0.9) (−1.50, −1.14) (−1.50; −1.14) (-1.49; -1.14)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All models estimated with year
indicators. Estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains with 40,000 iterations each where the first 10,000 are
discarded as burn-in, thinning rate was set to 5. Priors are N(0, 10).
that larger amounts of foreign aid should increase conflict risk due to the creation
of rent-seeking opportunities and possible attempts by insurgents to sabotage local
development projects. At the province level I find that the estimated effect at the
province level (table 4.1 col.1) has the opposite sign, indicating that positive changes in
aid correspond with changes to lower conflict intensity levels. The magnitude of the
effect is not very large: moving from low to high changes in aid levels corresponds with
just a 0.2% decrease in conflict intensity.29 Although the 95% interval shows that the
effect is not statistically significant, the results indicate a negative link with about 0.82
probability.30
The province level results contrast with the district level (col.4) where the magni-
tude of the estimated effect is near 0 and the probability of a negative link is just
0.46. This large difference in probability could be due to the fact that at the district
level there is no link between aid and conflict. There could be a case of an ecological
29These results are robust to the inclusion of country-specific time trends.
30There is some variation between 0.80 to 0.83 based on the model specification.
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fallacy here, where we would assume that the relation found at one level of aggregation
(provinces) would also be true at another level of aggregation (districts).31 Although
in both cases there is basically a null result based on the magnitude of the estimated
effect. The results also contrast with those of Berman et al. (2013) and Crost et al.
(2014) who use a similar level of aggregation, although they only look at a conflict in one
particular country. This discrepancy could also be partially explained by attenuation
bias as a result of measurement error. The use of a finer resolution means that some
observations are lost due to the precision of the geocoding. For the conflict events the
loss is not very large, just a 18.5% reduction in the number of observations. It is con-
siderably larger for the included number of aid projects, reducing the sample by 53.6%.32
At both levels of aggregation the strongest predictor for changes in conflict intensity is
the lagged outcome variable. Moving from low to high levels of intensity corresponds
negatively with current changes. Potentially this is due to some kind of mean-reversion
process as conflicts are relatively rare events, and even rarer are conflict events with
very high fatality counts.33 The estimated effect of the spatial lag also differs across
provinces and districts. This seems to indicate that the spillover effects of conflict are
confined to the smaller administrative units. It is easier for insurgents to move from one
district to another district than it is to move between larger provinces.34 As provinces
are the larger administrative units they might therefore not pick up the sub-national
variation the way districts do when conflict is highly localised.
Aid that goes directly to the government could increase state capacity and reduce
the probability of conflict onset and shorten conflict duration as found by de Ree
and Nillesen (2009). I therefore include a variable for government aid in the model
31See also Maystadt et al. (2014) for an example on mining and conflict in the DRC.
32Number of unique events per level of aggregation, at province level there are 7,381 conflict events
and 6,586 aid projects whereas the district level includes 6,008 conflict events and 3,052 aid projects.
33Conflicts, like other forms of human behaviour, exhibit universal patterns that approximate power-
law distributions (Bohorquez et al., 2009).
34Katanga in the DRC for instance is about 16 times the size of Belgium.
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(col.2) and find that at the province level positive changes in foreign aid going to the
government corresponds with an increase in conflict levels (75.6% probability). The
magnitude of this effect is almost identical to the negative effect of aid at the local level,
thereby offsetting each other. Again the results show a different effect at the district
level which is rather puzzling in this case given the fact that there are no changes in
the measurement of the variable.
The main aid variable is agnostic about the fungibility of aid, the ease with which it
can be diverted from its intended purposes. The reason for estimating the model with
a pooled aid variable is that in general aid is likely to become fungible if the donor is
not able to monitor the actual disbursement (Devajaran and Swaroop, 1998), which
is a reasonable assumption in this case.35 Rather than increasing net-expenditures
in particular sectors it could be that aid money is actually substituting government
spending. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) find that aid money is not necessarily fungible at the
aggregate level but that it depends on the sector for which the aid money is destined.
Development loans or grants for agriculture, education, and energy lead to a reduction
in government spending in these sectors whereas money earmarked for the transport
and communication sector are fully spend on the intended purposes. This entails that
at the local level aid going to these fungible aid sectors might be easier to appropriate
by insurgents as well (Findley et al., 2011). 36 I estimate the effect of aid accounting for
the potential fungibility. Following Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and Findley et al. (2011) aid
going to agriculture, education, energy supply and generation (as well as general budget
support) are coded as fungible whereas aid going to transport and communication is
coded as non-fungible.
The results show that at both the province and district level there is a likely no
35There is some debate in the literature whether aid is fungible or not. See the literature review in
Feridun (2014) for a synopsis.
36This effect is similar to what Dube and Vargas (2013) find for the capturing of rents from the oil
sector in Colombia.
111
4.5. Results 4. Foreign aid and conflict
effect between fungible aid and conflict. Non-fungible aid is more strongly negatively
linked with conflict. The magnitude of the effect for non-fungible aid is smaller at the
district level which again could be due to previous mentioned reasons such as attenuation
bias. The interpretation of the negative effect of non-fungible aid is that this aid type
improves local welfare and therefore increases the insurgents’ opportunity costs. In this
case we don’t see an increase in violence as a result of insurgents trying to sabotage the
project as was suggested in the Crost et al. (2014) study.
In general the estimations provide very little support for a link between aid and
conflict in either direction and this is consistent across a number of different robustness
checks. Including additional variables to account for changes in population and economic
activity (proxied by satellite night lights) doesn’t alter the results.37 Rather than using
inter-annual changes I estimate the model using aid shocks following Nielsen et al.
(2011). Again the results provide no strong support for a link between aid and conflict
in this sample.38 The results are also not specifically driven by the estimation method
as estimating the model with a more orthodox methods such as OLS produces very
similar results. 39
4.5.3 Comparing estimates with outcomes
The regression results only provide some very minor evidence for a link between aid and
conflict. In any case the magnitude of the potential effect is very minor. The estimated
coefficient in the main model is based on the assumption that the effect is homogeneous
across regions. There could be the possibility that aid actually has a different impact
37See table C.3 and C.4 for results.
38Shocks are defined as standardised deviations from the region mean: (Aidit − Aidi)/σAidi. See
table C.9 for results.
39See table C.5 and C.6.
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depending on the region. The estimated effect in the main model therefore could be
averaged out, missing region-specific effects. To account for this I re-estimate the
model allowing separate coefficients per region, both for the aid variable as well as
the variables that control for the temporal and spatial effect of conflict. Figure 4.5
shows the estimated coefficients for each region and illustrates that most region-specific
coefficients fall within a one standard deviation range of the estimated regression line of
the main model. Only at the district level there are some district located more remotely
from the main model’s regression line but still within two standard deviations. The
figure indicates that in general the main model seems to capture the effect of aid on
conflict accurately.
Figure 4.5: Estimated coefficient for each province (left) and district (right) along the
regression line from the main model. The grey lines for each coefficients indicate the
standard deviation.
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Figure 4.6 shows the actual change in conflict intensity compared to the estimated change
in conflict intensity generated by the pooled and the varying slope model. There does
not seem to be a systematic bias in the estimates and to some extent the model seems
quite capable matching the estimated changes with corresponding actual changes. The
model slightly underestimates the magnitudes of the changes in the outcome variable.
Also the zeroes in the outcome variable pose difficulties as there is a lot of scatter
around these observations where there are no changes in conflict intensity. Based on the
difference between the estimated outcomes at the provincial and district level, the model
unsurprisingly performs better with more data points as illustrated by the difference
in fit. Also the varying slope model fits the data marginally better than the pooled
regression model. Indicating that the region-specific coefficients for the variables better
capture the local conflict dynamics in contrast with the more generalised approach.
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Figure 4.6: Actual changes in conflict intensity compared to estimated changes at
province (top) and district (bottom) level using pooled regression (left) and a varying
slope model (right).
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4.5.4 Interaction effects
Besides the direct effect of aid on conflict I also consider the effect of interactions
between aid and other possible influential factors. These include the temporal and
spatial lag, distance from the capital, and ethnic polarisation, results for which are
summarised in figure 4.7.40
Figure 4.7: Estimates with 68% and 95% intervals for various interaction effects with
foreign aid.
40See table C.7 and table C.8 for results.
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In general all the interaction terms are skewed towards negative values. Consistent
with the main results the estimated effects are close to zero or have zero in their 95%
interval. The only exception to this is the interaction between the temporal lag and aid
at the district level. This effect is likely to be largely driven by the temporal lag. The
main results showed that higher levels of past conflict correspond with a reduction in
current conflict levels. Hodler and Knight (2012) show that foreign aid is more effective
in promoting economic growth in ethnic homogeneous countries. This might imply that
as aid is less effective in ethnically polarised regions as opportunity costs for insurgency
remain low and the aid itself provides rent-seeking opportunities. As a result these
regions might experience higher levels of conflict. The estimation result do not provide
support for this hypothesis as the effect of aid on conflict in regions with higher levels
of ethnic polarisation is not different from the main result. Similarly, the estimated
effect of aid is also not different in regions further away from the capital and regions in
conflict ridden neighbourhoods.
4.5.5 Effect of aid on conflict onset
So far the estimations have focussed on the effect of changes in aid on changes in conflict
intensity, i.e. looking at the intensive margin. I now consider the extensive margin
examining the effect of changes in aid on conflict onset, results are summarised in
figure 4.8.41
Most variables have relatively low predictive power, especially at the provincial level,
and is therefore not adequate in predicting the outbreak of conflict.42 Although at
the district level there seems to be a slightly stronger relation between foreign aid and
conflict onset. However, the strongest predictors for the outbreak of conflict are ethnic
polarisation and the presence of natural resources which have opposite effects. Ethnic
polarisation increases the probability of conflict onset which resonates with a number of
41This is the model specified according to Eq.2. Full results are reported in table D.1.
42See figure C.12.
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other studies (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Weidmann, 2009; Bosker and de Ree, 2014).
The presence of natural resources is negatively associated with conflict onset, but this
could be the result of a displacement effect where conflict actually takes place in the
surrounding areas as argued by Maystadt et al. (2014).
Figure 4.8: Logit estimates with 68% and 95% intervals at province (ADM1) and
district (ADM2) level.
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4.6 Conclusion
This study extends the aid-conflict literature by focussing on the link at the sub-national
level across different countries. This means that the full information on local develop-
ment projects and sub-national variation in conflict is retained. In contrast with the
existing work I find no strong effect of aid on conflict in either positive or negative
direction. The spatial analysis shows that although both aid and conflict cluster in lo-
calised geographic areas there does not exist a strong interdependence. In the regression
analysis I find no strong empirical proof for an effect of aid on conflict levels or conflict
onset. I do find that non-fungible aid corresponds negatively with conflict intensity but
the evidence is not very strong. The strongest predictor for conflict levels is the change
in past conflict levels where the analysis showed that current conflict levels decrease
after a previous year with very high levels. This shows that high levels of intensity
are relatively rare and not sustained over time. At the district level there is spillover
effect of conflict where districts in violent neighbourhoods are more likely to experience
violence. This effect is highly localised though as the analysis at a higher aggregation
level does not produce the same results.
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Chapter 5
Climate-conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Examining predictive
power
5.1 Introduction
There is an expanding literature that attempts to disentangle the factors that contribute
to the incidence of violent armed conflict. Within this research area much attention is
given to the robustness of results in terms of replicability, subject to the use of more
recent data and different model specifications. However, surprisingly little attention is
given to testing and analysing the predictive power of the models. Although for some
scientific research having a model with good descriptive power is sufficient, considering
conflict predictive power is particularly relevant given the damaging consequences of
war and its long lasting effects (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Chamarbagwala and
Morán, 2011; Serneels and Verpoorten, 2013). It is therefore remarkable that within
this body of research seemingly so little effort is made at prediction (see Schrodt (2013)
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for a comprehensive critique).
Despite the increase in research effort, which has lead to a general understanding of
some of the main factors that underlie conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Blattman
and Miguel, 2010), there seems to be no record of improvement in the accuracy of
predictions in the conflict literature. As Ward et al. (2010) observe:
too much attention has been paid to finding statistically significant rela-
tionships, while too little attention has been paid to finding variables that
improve our ability to predict civil wars
Predictions generated by models are often ignored while they provide useful information
on the model’s performance as shown in O’Loughlin et al. (2012) for instance. There
are some other notable exceptions to this trend, such as the recent studies by Goldstone
et al. (2010), Weidmann and Ward (2010), Gleditsch and Ward (2013), and Blair et al.
(2014).
This study contributes to this literature by attempting to predict war focussing on
the link between climate and conflict. There is a growing body of research examining
how climate influence economics outcomes and affects human well-being (see Dell et al.
(2014) for an overview). There are large concerns about the human impacts of global
warming and it is therefore important to understand the relation in order to assess the
risks (Stern, 2006; German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2008). I focus on this
particular field as it is of great interest due to climate change forecasts (IPCC, 2014)
and because of the potential climate-conflict nexus. I say potential here because within
the academic community there is an ongoing debate on the scientific evidence for a link
between climate change and the risk of violent armed conflict (see for instance Scheffran
et al. (2012a); Hsiang and Burke (2013); Hsiang et al. (2013); Klomp and Bulte (2013);
Buhaug et al. (2014); Hsiang and Meng (2014); Hsiang et al. (2014); Raleigh et al.
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(2014)).1
From this literature I use the model from the seminal work by Burke et al. (2009)
who found that higher temperatures are linked to increased probabilities of war in
Africa. Simulation based predictions of their model show that, conditional on historical
patterns, by 2030 there will be a 54% increase in armed conflict incidence relative to the
1981-2002 baseline. This increase could even be an underestimate according to a more
recent study (Burke et al., 2014). The reason for focussing on this particular model is
because of its central place in the literature as well as the simplicity of the model, which
should be beneficial to generating accurate predictions.2 There has been some debate
with regard to the robustness of the results, where the critiques have predominantly
focussed on sensitivity to model specification and re-estimation using more recent data
(Buhaug, 2010; Sutton et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2010; Hsiang and Meng, 2014). The
reply from Buhaug (2010) seems to be the most forceful critique on the original study,
claiming that climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict and that African
civil wars can be explained by other more structural and contextual factors such poor
economic performance for instance.
Hsiang and Meng (2014) disagree with this conclusion arguing that there is no statistical
difference between the model specifications used by Burke et al. (2009) and Buhaug
(2010).3
1Edward Miguel, one of the leading scientists in this field of research, likened the research on
climate-conflicts to the research on smoking about 50 years ago, arguing that we figured out that
climate causes conflict but don’t know how to prevent it (TEDxBerkeley, 2014).This analogy seems a
bit premature given the lack of consensus in the literature. Other overview articles, not mentioned in
the text, include Bernauer et al. (2012), Gleditsch (2012),Scheffran et al. (2012b), Meierding (2013).
2Their research has been cited 385 times since its publication in 2009 (according to Google Scholar,
18 April 2015).
3Hsiang and Meng (2014) found that Buhaug’s results are not different from those in Burke et al.
work based on the implementation of various statistical test, but do not attempt to verify whether the
findings of Burke et al. were correct. See O’Loughlin et al. (2014) for a critique on the Hsiang and
Meng (2014) study and Buhaug (2014) for Buhaug’s reply.
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To the best of my knowledge, no study has attempted to use the model for generating
predictions for real out-of-sample data. This study is probably most similar to Buhaug
(2010), who use the original data of Burke et al., shorten the time period for model
estimation to 1981-1998 and generate predictions for 1999-2003. In contrast, using the
original model estimations I generate predicted probabilities for conflict using the most
recent available data covering 2003-2013 which is a more extensive cross-validation of
the model.4
The regression analysis shows that the model seems to do exceptionally well for in-sample
prediction and in general has high descriptive power based on an Area Under the Curve
(AUC) value of around 0.98.5 These results seems to be an overfit however as examining
the results in closer detail I find that the predicted values are almost entirely contingent
on the inclusion of the country fixed effects and country-specific time trends.
For the out-of-sample predictions the model produces a large number of false positives
(for countries with high levels of conflict prevalence), while at the same time failing to
correctly predict war incidence in countries with slightly lower levels of past conflict
prevalence. It seems that the in-sample performance on the training data exaggerates
minor fluctuations in the data where the results do not generalise beyond the cases
studied. Both the regression and prediction results show that the performance of the
model is mainly driven by the inclusion of country fixed effects and country-specific
time trends, whereas the inclusion of variables capturing climate variability adds little
to no predictive power.
4This study thus provides a replication of the original work and an extension according to the
proposed terminology of Clemens (2015).
5This is the AUC of the Receiver/Operator Curve (ROC) which measures the false positive rate
versus the true positive rate. AUC values closer to 1 indicate a more accurate model. The AUC values
for the three models are: model 1, 0.981; model 2, 0.981; model 3, 0.936. Omitting all explanatory
variables and estimating the LPM with only country fixed effects and a country-specific time trend, the
results still report a high AUC statistic of 0.980 which is a reduction in predictive power of just 0.09%
compared to the preferred model (model 1).
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5.2 Results
5.2.1 In-sample predictions
I start with replicating the results in order to check the in-sample predictive power
of the model. As I try to argue in this paper that cross-validation should be part
of the analysis, it could of course be that for some reason this isn’t possible due to
lack of data. When data is sparse one can always examine the in-sample predictive
power of the model as I will illustrate in this section. Additionally, in most quantitative
studies there is a lot of focus on the statistical significance of the estimated parameters
based on the traditional p-value thresholds. This litmus test, so to speak, was never
meant to be a definitive test when it was introduced by Fisher but intended as an
indicative test for evidence worth a second look (Nuzzo, 2014). Again, looking at the
predictive power of the parameters can give us a better insight into the relation of interest.
The original data covers 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1981-2002.
The preferred model (model 1) has the following functional form:
Warit = β1Temperatureit + β2Temperaturei,t−1 + ci + diyeart + it (5.1)
The regression equation links civil war to current and lagged temperature levels
(Temperature), conditional on country fixed effects (ci) and time trends (diyeart).6
Although War is a binary outcome variable, the model is estimated using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). It seems to make little sense fitting a continuous regression to
an outcome variable that can only take two values (Gelman and Hill, 2007). However,
6Additional models include measures for current and lagged rainfall levels (model 2), and explicit
lagged country controls for income per capita and regime type (model 3). Model 3 also includes year
indicators rather than a country-specific time trend. Model 1 and 2 do not include year indicators
meaning that they do not account for worldwide changes (Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014). Civil wars
are conflicts with >1,000 battle-related deaths, temperature is measured in Celsius.
124
5.2. Results 5. Climate-conflict: Examining predictive power
due to the use of time-series cross sectional data and the inclusion of fixed effects, a
Linear Probability Model (LPM) might be preferred over non-linear models (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008).7 Nonetheless, there are some concerns with using a LPM such as
heteroskedasticity due to the binary outcome variable and the fact that the predicted
probabilities are not constrained by the 0-1 interval.8 Figure 5.1 shows the predicted
probabilities for each model and illustrates that there are indeed predicted values outside
the unit interval. This might not be of too much concern as long as not too many values
fall outside of the interval. However, in this case the results are a reason of concern:
Examination of the preferred model (model 1) shows that the predicted probabilities
for 39% of the observations have a value smaller than 0 or larger than 1. As a result,
the estimates can be biased and inconsistent (Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006).9
Given that warming increases the risk of war we would expect that the fitted probabili-
ties follow a trend where higher temperatures correspond with higher fitted probabilities.
To examine this I plot the fitted probabilities against the temperature deviations from
the country mean, as shown in figure 5.2. I use deviations from the country mean in
order to better compare across countries.10 The figure illustrates that there is no clear
trend with regard to higher temperatures being associated with higher probabilities of
war. The figure does show that in general the model is accurate in correctly predicting
the incidence of armed conflict, as most observations with war correspond with higher
fitted probabilities.
7Beck and Katz (2011) shows that estimating a LPM is as good as logit as long as the explanatory
variables are normally distributed. An additional concern, not addressed in this study, is that due to
the inclusion of fixed effects there is the concern of Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981) with N = 41 and T = 21.
I refer to Gaibulloev et al. (2014) for an extensive discussion on the inconsistencies arising from the use
of fixed effects in dynamic panel data.
8The heteroskedasticity will be accounted for by the use robust standard errors clustered by country.
9Model 1 generates 15 values above 1 and 334 below 0. Because of the probability of biased and
inconsistent estimates, the LPM should be used as a basis for comparison with more appropriate models
such as logit. See the appendix for model estimations done using logit.
10This also parallels the model as it is estimated using country fixed effects which demeans the
temperature variables using within-transformation (i.e. Tit − Ti).
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Figure 5.1: Histograms for fitted values of the linear probability model according to
three different specifications.
Figure 5.2: Fitted probabilities versus temperature deviations from the mean for
preferred model (model 1).
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To measure the model’s in-sample predictive power I use a separation plot, shown in
figure 5.3. In a separation plot the predicted outcomes of the model are ordered along
the x-axis from low to high (also indicated by the line through the plot), and the dark
(light) panels correspond with incidences of war (no war) (Greenhill et al., 2011). 11
If a model is capable of matching high-probability predictions with actual events, and
low-probability predictions with no events, we should observe a plot separating the dark
and light panels. Figure 5.3 shows that all three models perform well in separating the
cases from the controls. Looking at the Area Under the Curve (AUC) statistic confirms
the high in-sample predictive power with values of about 0.98 for model 1 and 2 and
0.94 for model 3. Similar to Buhaug (2010) I find that the high predictive power of the
model seems to be predominantly driven by the inclusion of the fixed effects and that
the temperature variable has little explanatory power (see appendix).
Figure 5.3: In-sample separation plots for the three model specifications.
11The triangular marker indicates the expected number of events (from right to left) based on the
cumulative of predicted probabilities.
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5.2.2 Out-of-sample predictions
For the out-of-sample predictions I update the dataset to cover the period between 2003-
2013 using the most recent data on conflict, temperature, income, and regime type.12
The outcome variable in the model is the incidence of major conflicts, i.e. conflicts
resulting in > 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, identical to the original work.
Figure 5.4 shows the average temperature for each country and the whole sample along
with the proportion of countries that experience civil war. The figure illustrates that for
all countries there has been increase in temperature over time. For 2003-2013 the average
temperature is about 0.3◦C higher than in 1980s. The upward trend in temperature
is what we would expect given the results from the climate change research (IPCC,
2014).13 At the same time the figure also illustrates that there has been a decreasing
trend in the number of civil wars in line with the thesis of Pinker (2011). Although on
average Sub-Sahara Africa has been getting warmer, there has been a decline in the
number of civil wars. This challenges the idea that warming increases the risk of civil war.
The main model is cross validated by generating predictions for 2003-2013. Simi-
lar to the in-sample predictions, the LPM generates predicted probabilities outside the
unit interval, ranging from -0.97 to 1.22 (upper panel figure 5.5) with about 37% of
all values outside the interval.14 With an AUC statistic of 0.80, the predictions seem
reasonably accurate.15 Inspection of the separation plot shows however that the model
is not entirely accurate in its predictions (upper panel figure 5.5). At the higher end
of the probability distribution the model correctly separates observations with war
12Conflict data is taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Climate
data comes from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia (Harris et al., 2014).
Income data is taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012) and data on regime
type from Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2013).
13See figure D.2 for a graph of only the temperature data.
14I don’t report results for predictions using the other two models as the predicted probabilities fall
well outside the unit interval. For example, when including rainfall the predicted probabilities range
from -11 to 14. Analytically this does not make much sense.
15N = 451, 18 cases of war.
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from those without but there are also clusters of false negatives. This is not entirely
surprising as war is relative rare with just 4% of the observations coded as experiencing
civil war.
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Figure 5.4: Temperature over time and proportion of countries with civil war,
1980-2013 The light shaded lines represent the temperature time series for each
individual country while the darker shaded line represents the sample average. The
dashed line shows the proportion of countries in civil war. Source Temperature data
comes from Climatic Research Unit-Univeristy of East Anglia, conflict data comes from
UCDP/PRIO.
Figure 5.5: Out-of-sample predicted values and separation plot (2003-2013)
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This is also illustrated by figure 5.6. In contrast with the in-sample predictions (fig-
ure 5.2), the model is less accurate in correctly predicting the outcome leading to more
false positives. Similar to the in-sample predictions the results show that there no clear
association between higher temperatures and higher predicted probabilities of war.16
Figure 5.6: Predicted probabilities versus temperature deviations from the mean for
preferred model.
In general the model seems to over-predict the incidence of violent armed conflict. Using
pˆ > 0.5 as a threshold for forecasting war, the model predicts wars in 37 observations.
Out of these 37 observations 7 actually experience war leaving 30 false positives as well
as generating 11 false negatives (all summarised in table 5.1).17 If we only consider the
predicted wars than then out-of-sample prediction success rate drops considerably: only
18.9% of the predicted wars actually experienced a war compared with a 68.2% success
rate for the in-sample data.
16As the graph shows there is one exception which is Sudan in 2010, but this was an ongoing war.
17The logit model performs similarly but includes more false positives.
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Interestingly the model identifies a number of countries in the Great Lakes region
such as Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda as high risk countries. The model also consistently
generated high probabilities for Sudan which to some extent resonates with the results
by Maystadt et al. (2014).
Table 5.1: Actual versus predicted wars out-of-sample for 2003-2013
pˆ ≤ 0.5 pˆ > 0.5
No war 403 obs. Angola (2003-2005)
Burundi (2003-2013)
DRC (2003-2012)
Rwanda (2013)
Sudan (2005, 2007-2009, 2013)
War Chad (2006) DRC (2013)
Liberia (2003) Sudan (2003, 2004, 2006, 2010-2012)
Nigeria (2013)
Rwanda (2009)
Somalia (2007-2012)
Uganda (2004)
A possible explanation for the over prediction could be that over the past decade African
wars have become less sensitive to climate, an argument also brought forth by Burke
et al. (2010).18 For 15 of the 30 false positives there was a conflict in the predicted
country-year, although at a lower intensity level (<1,000 battle-related deaths).19 This
could suggest that maybe the conflicts that are responsive to temperature have become
less intense.20 Accounting for this by including minor conflicts with between 25 and
999 battle-related deaths does triple the correct prediction rate for conflicts (from 7 to
22) and reduces the false positive rate by half (from 30 to 15). However, there is also a
steep increase in the false negative rate which stands at 69 now.
18Burke et al. (2010) state that "African conflict appears less sensitive to climate over the past decade,
a change likely related to the unprecedented growth and democratization that most of the continent
has recently experienced".
19There were civil conflicts in the following country-years: Angola 2004; Burundi 2003-2006, 2008;
DRC 2006-2008, 2012; Sudan 2005, 2007-2009.
20See figure D.3 for trends in conflict over time.
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Rather than focussing on predicted conflict in specific country-years we can also consider
the general forecast of civil wars. For each year I tally all the predicted probabilities
and compare it with the actual number of wars, as shown in figure 5.7 which includes
both the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts. Save for some local reversals the actual
number of civil wars in a given year has declined from around 5 per year between
1981-2002, to 2 per year for 2003-2013. This trend in the data is captured by the model
through the inclusion of the country fixed effects and specific time trends. The forecast
number of wars moves towards zero over time. In the training data (1981-2002) the
temperature variables capture some of the local reversions which is also reflected in
the out-of-sample data. In contrast with the previous exercise, based on predicted
probabilities alone the model performs slightly better. The forecast number of wars is
on average only 0.5 off the actual number of wars and 0.3 if I exclude 2005 which seems
like an outlier.21
Figure 5.7: Forecast of number of wars versus the actual number of wars.
21For 2003-2013 the model forecast 24 wars. The actual number was 18. For the training data the
sum of predicted probabilities equals the actual number of wars (98).
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A worry with regard to the predicted outcomes is that these could be predominantly
driven by the inclusion of country fixed effects and country-specific time trends, as the
predicted probabilities with values >0.5 are all in countries with high levels of past
conflict prevalence. Omitting country fixed effects from the model, estimating only
with the temperature variable and country-specific year trend leads to exactly the same
predictions as the full model.22 It therefore seems that the effect of factors such as
geographical characteristics and colonial history on conflict risk are comparable across
countries.
To test the predictive power of the temperature variable I generate predictions based
on a model estimated with fixed effects and time trends only, the results for which are
very similar to the full model (including temperature variables). The main difference
is that this model leads to a slightly larger number of false positives, 34 versus 30,
but it correctly predicts the same wars.23 The results are identical when generating
predictions from a model with country-specific time trends only, indicating that the
predicted probabilities are almost exclusively driven by the inclusion of these effects.
Figure 5.8 illustrates these differences in predictive power for three different models:
A model specified with the temperature variables and country-specific year trend, a
model with only the temperature variables, and a model with only the country-specific
year trend. The results show that including the country-specific time trend is beneficial
for the predictive power of the model, and also that there is little difference between a
LPM with or without temperature.
22Using a model omitting the country-specific time trend reduces the range of predicted values and
leads to fewer predicted wars. The number of correctly predicted wars decreases by 1, false positives by
3 while false negatives increase by 1.
23See table D.3 for results
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Figure 5.8: Predictive performance linear probability model based on alterations in
model specification.
As an additional check I generate predictions using a benchmark civil war model includ-
ing lagged time-varying covariates on GDP per capita, population, regime type, natural
resource rents, and a fixed variable for ethnic polarisation.24 The model is estimated
using OLS as well as logit.
Accurately predicting war is difficult as illustrated by figure 5.9. In all estimations the
predicted outcomes are below 0.5, which was used as threshold so far. The LPM model
including the temperature variable is the only one producing predicted probabilities
outside the 0-1 interval. In general the LPM and logit results are comparable and in
both cases separation is not perfect. According to the AUC statistic, the LPM actually
has a slight edge over logit (0.769 vs. 0.765) in correctly predicting the outcome (note:
these are the models without the temperature variable). However, since there are a lot
of zeroes in the data it is not too difficult to register high AUC statistics, and as shown
both models have trouble correctly identifying the cases that experienced civil war.
24Data on GDP, population, and natural resource rents all taken from World Bank Development
Indicators. Resource rents are measured as percentage of GDP. Regime type is taken from the Polity
IV project and data on ethnic polarisation from Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
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Estimating the benchmark model including the temperature variables leads to a 8
percentage point reduction in the AUC statistic and reduces the predictive power of
the model as illustrated in the lower panel of figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Predictive performance of a standard civil war model using linear
probability model and logit with and without temperature variables.
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Predicting conflict accurately is a difficult task. There are many complex underlying
dynamics that are overlooked by the statistical models and there is always the issue
that certain social constructions don’t behave uniformly which makes predicting conflict
very difficult indeed. In the quantitative literature on violent armed conflict there seems
to be very little appreciation for the predictive power of the models as most analyses
focus on the statistical significance of the variables. This studies follows Ward et al.
(2010) and argues that examining predicted probabilities and generating out-of-sample
predictions can provide useful insights in the performance of the models.
To illustrate this I focus on the highly contested research area of climate-conflict. Using
one of the standard models linking temperature to climate, I find that it produces
inaccurate out-of-sample predictions which are mainly driven by the inclusion of country
fixed effects and country-specific time trends rather than the variable of interest. Using
a benchmark civil war model I find that out-of-sample prediction is difficult in general:
the time-varying covariates have little predictive power and this model performs worse
when including temperature.
As I attempt to gauge the predictive power of temperature variation on conflict, there
are two issues that are not accounted for and that might be of interest for future research
on conflict prediction and are also described in O’Loughlin et al. (2012) and O’Loughlin
et al. (2014). First, the model estimates the link between weather variation and conflict
using the country-year as unit of analysis. This means that it neglects within-country as
well as within-year variability in both climate and conflict. Second, using a crude binary
indicator means that a lot of information on conflict intensity is lost. Additionally, the
assumption that the relationship observed between climate and conflict in the past
will be the same in the future might be misleading. These are factors worth taking
into account for further examination of the predictive power of climate variability on
violence.
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A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (1981-2010)
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
A. Civil Conflict
Civil conflict (≥ 25 deaths) 0.21 0.41 1389
Onset 0.06 0.23 1101
Offset 0.24 0.43 289
Onset (5-year intermittency period) 0.04 0.19 954
B. Precipitation
Rainfall (mm) 1023.44 552.55 1389
Rainfall growtht 0.02 0.23 1389
Rainfall growtht−1 0.02 0.23 1389
Rainfall anomalyt −0.01 0.99 1389
Rainfall anomalyt−1 −0.01 0.99 1389
C. Economic Growth
GDP growth ratet 0.01 0.07 1299
GDP growth ratet−1 0.01 0.07 1288
Agricultural sector growth ratet 0.00 0.10 1088
Industrial sector growth ratet 0.02 0.11 1058
D. Country Controls
Peace years 14.40 13.50 1389
Ln Populationt−1 15.46 1.47 1389
Regime typet−1 37.33 26.61 1356
Ln GDP per capita 1979 7.05 0.74 1389
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (PREG index) 0.40 0.24 1221
Rough terrain (% land area covered by mountains) 12.08 21.07 1389
Oil exportst−1 0.07 0.26 1387
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A.2 Additional regression results
Table A.2: Effect of rainfall on economic growth, 1981−1999 (IV−2SLS, first stage)
MSS rainfall data New rainfall data
Rainfall measure Growth Growth Anomaly
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfallt 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Rainfallt−1 0.03** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Country FE − Yes − Yes − Yes
Country-specific year trend − Yes − Yes − Yes
Root MSE 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
N 743 743 743 743 743 743
Notes. Data from Miguel et al. (2004)). Columns 3 to 6 use new rainfall data. Estimates
rounded to two decimals. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Robust standard
errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
Table A.3: Effect of rainfall on economic growth for different periods (IV−SLS, first
stage)
Period 1981-2010 1981-1999 2000-2010
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfallt 0.02** 0.01*** 0.02* 0.01*** 0.01 0.00*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Rainfallt−1 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Root MSE 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
N 1299 1299 796 796 503 503
Notes. Results in odd columns are for growth, anomalies in even columns. Estimates
rounded to two decimals. FE, Fixed effects; MSE, Mean squared error. Robust standard
errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses. *** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
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Appendix B
Food prices and the incidence of
violence in Africa, 1990-2011
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B.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics food price index (FPI) per country.
Country Mean FPI SD FPI Minimum
FPI
Maximum
FPI
N
Algeria 2.098 0.3227 1.4388 3.0123 264
Angola 0.3925 0.0856 0.2503 0.6181 264
Benin 0.7576 0.1731 0.4947 1.334 264
Botswana 0.5181 0.0941 0.342 0.77 264
Burkina Faso 0.8782 0.2418 0.4772 1.7337 264
Burundi 0.3468 0.0812 0.148 0.5806 264
Cameroon 0.3003 0.0495 0.2053 0.4535 264
Central African Republic 0.8774 0.1817 0.4994 1.3763 264
Chad 0.3176 0.0588 0.2175 0.477 264
Congo, Republic Of 0.3273 0.0646 0.2066 0.5786 264
Congo, The Democratic Republic Of 0.7757 0.1403 0.555 1.2639 264
Côte D’Ivoire 0.6956 0.1706 0.4164 1.3268 264
Egypt 1.9979 0.3198 1.3985 3.0462 264
Eritrea 2.4914 0.4164 1.7181 3.8799 228
Ethiopia 0.8165 0.1413 0.5822 1.3421 264
Gabon 0.1388 0.0264 0.096 0.2364 264
Gambia 3.4681 0.8263 2.0223 5.6178 264
Ghana 0.5736 0.1124 0.3772 0.8544 264
Guinea 1.7418 0.4093 1.1673 2.9135 264
Guinea-Bissau 3.1163 0.7763 1.9169 5.717 264
Kenya 0.5623 0.1588 0.3277 0.9958 264
Lesotho 2.3232 0.3729 1.5566 3.3365 264
Liberia 8.7718 2.3693 5.0858 16.7674 264
Libya 1.1448 0.1736 0.8402 1.6254 264
Madagascar 0.133 0.1389 -0.1598 0.6801 264
Malawi 1.2074 0.3427 0.3151 2.1994 264
Mali 1.1642 0.2858 0.6525 1.9147 264
Mauritania 5.3745 1.1267 3.2312 8.3928 264
Mauritius -4.6571 1.6668 -8.9297 -1.2986 264
Morocco 0.7574 0.1316 0.4931 1.1452 264
Mozambique 2.5048 0.4356 1.865 3.7611 264
Namibia 0.5117 0.1207 0.2648 0.8436 264
Niger 1.6399 0.3591 1.0577 2.6294 264
Nigeria 0.1815 0.0411 0.1155 0.2837 264
Rwanda 0.5863 0.1465 0.3703 0.9925 264
Senegal 1.9777 0.4597 1.2253 3.6105 264
Sierra Leone 3.4262 0.8413 2.1188 6.2787 264
Somalia 5.4937 1.1084 3.6927 9.3888 264
South Africa -0.3345 0.0498 -0.4717 -0.2254 264
Sudan 0.326 0.092 0.1743 0.6278 264
Swaziland -6.2454 2.1404 -11.8534 -1.9659 264
Tanzania 0.2254 0.0632 0.1206 0.4128 264
Togo 1.6226 0.3316 1.0559 2.4632 264
Tunisia 1.5192 0.237 1.0697 2.2687 264
Uganda 0.1614 0.036 0.0971 0.2645 264
Zambia 0.3815 0.0602 0.2699 0.5717 264
Zimbabwe -1.0203 0.2251 -1.6383 -0.5624 264
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B.2 Complementary results
B.2.1 Comparison of delayed prices effects and price spikes
Table B.3: Comparison of the effects of lagged food prices, growth, and anomalies on
violence.
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
FPI 0.6 −0.7
(0.4) (0.8)
FPI(t−1) 2
(2)
FPI(t−2) −2
(2)
FPI(t−3) 2.5
(0.9)***
FPI(t−4) −1.1
(0.8)
FPI(t−5) −0.5
(0.5)
∆ FPI −0.027
(0.005)***
∆ FPI(t−1) 0.11
(0.01)
FPIσ 0.1
(0.1)
FPIσ,(t−1) 0.2
(0.1)
Residual deviance 6009.8 6008.2 6055.8 5998.0
AIC 12146 12150 11966 12134
AUC 0.7901 0.7902 0.802 0.791
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All specifications
include country controls (not reported), country and year fixed effects. FPI is the
country-specific food price index. AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC, Area Under
the Curve. N = 10722
The main model focuses on the effect of anomalies in food price levels on violence.
Recent research has shown that over the past years volatility of prices has not increased
Minot (2014) and also that the link between food prices and unrest is mainly associated
with a level effect Bellemare (2015). I therefore estimate the model using current levels,
the results show a positive correlation between fluctuations from the long term trend
in food prices and violence (see table B.3 col.1). The coefficient is not statistically
significant within the orthodox boundaries with a p-value of 0.13 (Z-value=1.5).
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Since we are dealing with international food prices, it could be that there is a delay
in the responsiveness of domestic prices (Baquedano and Liefert, 2014). The model
is specified to include additional time lags to control for past 5 months of food price
levels (col.2) The estimation produces relatively large coefficients with equally large
standard errors. Only for t− 3 I find that there is a positive link with violence. Moving
from low to high values corresponds with an increase in the log count of the outcome
variable of 2.5 which is very large. It could be that both the government and consumers
are more sensitive to sudden increases in prices, rather than levels, as this puts certain
immediate constraints on their budget. I estimate the model using inter-monthly growth
rates and find that current growth rates are negatively linked to violence. Although
the effect is statistically significant, the magnitude is very low: moving from low to
high growth rates corresponds with a decrease in the log count of just 0.027. The main
results focused on current shocks which were positively associated with violence levels.
Including an additional lag in the model reduces the magnitude of the estimated effect
and it ceases to be statistically significant (col.4).
I also estimate the model including an interaction term between the FPI and a dummy
indicating whether there was a food crises in that particular month, based on the
characteristics described in Cuesta et al. (2014). For both 5 months of positive growth
or an increase in prices of at least 15% in 5 months time I found that there was no clear
effect with regard to violence levels.1
1Results available on request.
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B.2.2 Other outcome variables
One of the advantages of the SCAD dataset, compared to other available datasets on
violence and conflict, is that it codes the events for various types of social conflict. This
means that it covers a large spectrum of violence intensity ranging from protests to
civil conflict as well as including information on the location of the event (i.e. urban
and rural areas). This information is used to examine whether food prices might be
linked to particular types of unrest or unrest in particular places. I re-estimate the main
model changing the outcome variable to correspond with a particular type of unrest,
the results for which are summarised in figure B.3 where the estimated effect from the
main model is included as a reference point.2
Figure B.3: Point estimates, 68% and 95% interval for the effect of food prices on
different event types (see table B.4).
2See table B.4 and B.5 for full results.
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The main outcome variable (violence) includes events which initially start out as non-
violent, such as peaceful demonstrations, but then escalate into violence. Excluding
these escalations from the outcome variable does not affect the results much as the
effect’s magnitude and level of statistical significance remain similar. I do find that when
excluding cases of pro-government violence from the outcome variable the standard
error increases while there is a small reduction in coefficient size reducing the level of
the statistical significance of the results.
I now move on to estimating the link between food prices and different types of events:
The main outcome variable includes violent evens within a large range of intensity. The
results seem to suggest that there is a particular strong association between food prices
and civil conflict compared to the other event types.3 However, this result should be
interpreted with caution though as civil conflicts are also most likely to be picked up
by the media. The results provide no evidence for a clear pattern between food price
shocks and a particular event type such as strikes and protests (non-violent events) or
government-targeted events (directed at the local or central government.). For most
event types the uncertainty interval includes the value of the coefficient in the main
model though. These results could simply be due to a bias in measurement. The only
exception to this is are non-violent events, but this coefficient still has an overlapping
uncertainty interval although it doesn’t include the main coefficient.
To account for possible within-country differences I test whether the effect of food
prices is different in urban compared to rural areas. Although urban dwellers tend to
be relatively wealthier and have higher purchasing power than their rural counterparts,
they also tend to be food net-consumers whereas rural inhabitants often dependent
on subsistence agriculture which makes them slightly less dependent on food imports
and international price changes (Cohen and Garrett, 2010). The results show that the
estimated effect is not much different in urban areas (β = 0.24, s.e = 0.11) compared to
3Civil conflict is in this case defined as a violent event waged by militant factions.
170
rural areas (β = 0.20, s.e = 0.09).4
4The reported number of violent incidents is almost equal: urban, 1483; rural, 1598.
171
Table B.4: Effect of food prices on different types of civil unrest.
Outcome variable All unrest Civil
conflict
Minor
violence
Government-
targeted
events
Non-
violent
event
Excluding
escalation
Excluding
pro-
government
violence
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FPI 0.15 0.36 0.1 0.11 0.05 0.27 0.23
(0.06)** (0.10)*** (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)*** (0.08)
Violence(t−1) 0.36 0.45 0.28 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.40
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Residual deviance 7988.2 3346.3 4329.7 6382.5 6266.5 5549.4 5818.9
AIC 17825 6413.4 8036.2 13258 12586 10985 11567
AUC 0.7735 0.8446 0.7858 0.758 0.7634 0.7996 0.7919
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include country controls (not reported), country and year fixed effects.
FPI is the country-specific food price index. AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC,
Area Under the Curve N = 10722
Table B.5: The effect of food prices on violence in rural and urban areas.
Negative binomial Logit
Outcome variable Urban
violence
Rural
violence
Urban
violence
Rural
violence
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
FPI 0.2 0.20 0.3 0.25
(0.1)** (0.09)** (0.1)** (0.10)**
Violencet−1 0.29 0.41 0.54 0.6
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.1)***
ViolenceC−i 0.07 −0.09 0.09 −0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
∆ GDP pc. −0.3 0 −0.3 0.1
(0.2) (0.08) (0.2)* (0.1)
IMR −1.7 −1 −1.3 −0.7
(0.4)*** (1) (0.5)** (1.0)
Population −3 −4 −2 −2
(3) (7) (3) (6)
Regime type −0.1 0.1 −0.1 0
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Residual deviance 4169.5 3880.7 5766.6 5360.0
AIC 7391.2 7300 5909.6 5506
AUC 0.7888 0.8315 0.7929 0.8346
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include country and year fixed effects. FPI is the country-specific food
price index. IMR, Infant mortality rate; AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC, Area
Under the Curve. N = 10722
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B.2.3 Political heterogeneity and country characteristics
Although the estimation results shown that the variable for regime type had little
explanatory power, the study by Hendrix et al. (2009) found that the food-unrest nexus
was largely contingent on regime type. I examine whether there is a potential link
between political heterogeneity, food prices, and violence using data from Papaioannou
and Siourounis (2008) to categorise countries into three main groups: autocracies,
anocracies, and democracies. Additionally, I also create categories for countries that
have undergone a democratisation process, as these states might suffer more instability,
and oil exporters who could use oil revenues for social spending to counter higher food
prices.5 I re-estimate the model including an interaction effect between the country
type and the FPI to estimate if the effect might be stronger in particular countries. The
estimation results, shown in table B.6, indicate that for some regime types the effect
of food prices on unrest can be more profound, i.e. in autocracies. Surprisingly the
estimated coefficients for both anocracies and countries that have experienced change
are negative, indicating a negative link between food prices and violence intensity. The
estimated effect is much stronger than in democracies and oil exporting countries and
comes with greater certainty.
5Country types are given in table B.2
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Table B.6: Effect of food prices on violence across different regime types and oil
exporting countries.
Autocracies Democracies Anocracies Democratisation
process
Oil
exporters
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FPI 0.1 0.30 0.3 0.43 0.3
(0.1) (0.08)*** (0.1)*** (0.08)*** (0.1)***
FPI × country type 0.3 −0.1 −0.3 −0.3 −0.1
(0.1)** (0.2) (0.1)** (0.1)** (0.1)
Residual deviance 6011.5 5998.0 6006.0 6011.1 6003.5
AIC 12122 12134 12126 12121 12117
AUC 0.7917 0.791 0.7916 0.7916 0.7925
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***,
**, and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
All specifications include country control (not reported), country and year fixed effects.
FPI is the country-specific food price index. AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC,
Area Under the Curve. N = 10722
174
B.3 Robustness checks and additional tables
Table B.7: Comparison of the effect of food prices on violence per period.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specifications 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2011
FPI 0.2 0 0.1 0.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)*
Violence(t−1) 0.26 0.07 0.11 0.26
(0.08)*** (0.04)* (0.06)** (0.09)***
Violence(C−i) 0.3 0 0.04 −0.05
(0.1)** (0.1) (0.10) (0.07)
∆ GDP pc. −0.1 −0.2 0.1 0.05
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.08)
IMR 6 1 0 −1
(3)** (2) (2) (2)
Population 0 −29 10 −13
(8) (19) (14) (10)
Regime type 0 0.4 −0.7 −0.1
(0.4) (0.3) (0.2)*** (0.3)
Residual deviance 951.07 1228.4 1462.1 2245.5
AIC 1955.1 2452.9 2787.9 4626.8
AUC 0.8186 0.8199 0.7943 0.8242
N 2226 2412 2460 3624
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include country and year fixed effects. FPI is the country-specific food
price index. IMR, Infant mortality rate; AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC, Area
Under the Curve.
Table B.8: Effect of food prices on violence controlling for increased time lags for
violence.
3 months 6 months 12 months
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
FPI 0.25 0.23 0.22
(0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)***
Violence(lag) 0.53 0.6 0.6
(0.09)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)***
Residual deviance 6006.2 5940.4 5880.6
AIC 11994 11887 11741
AUC 0.7943 0.7942 0.7942
N 10638 10512 10260
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include country controls (not reported), country and year fixed effects.
FPI is the country-specific food price index. AIC, Akaike information criterion; AUC,
Area Under the Curve.
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Table B.9: Regression results different model estimation methods.
Poisson Logit Quasi-Poisson OLS OLS
Outcome variable Count Binary Log-count Log-count Binary
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆FPI 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.038 0.044
(0.09)** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Residual deviance 6056.5 8026.8 4278.8 − −
Residual standard error − − − 0.3153 0.3414
AIC 11966 8172.8 − − −
AUC 0.787 0.7973 0.7378 0.731 0.7941
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include the standard explanatory variables (not reported), country and
year fixed effects. FPI is the country-specific food price index. AIC, Akaike information
criterion;AUC, Area Under the Curve. N = 10722
Table B.10: Robustness checks for the effect of food prices on violence.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specifications Excluding
lagged outcome
variable
Oil price index Interaction with
landlocked
countries
Including food
aid
Excluding
Nigeria and
South Africa
FPI 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26
(0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)***
Oil price index 0.1
(0.1)
Food aid(ln) 0.4
(0.1)***
FPI × Landlocked 0.1
(0.1)
Violence(t−1) 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.41
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Residual deviance 6011.8 5997.2 6013.5 5998.5 5998.3
AIC 12323 12135 12113 12135 12133
AUC 0.781 0.791 0.792 0.791 0.791
Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-level, in parentheses where ***, **,
and * respectively indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
specifications include the standard explanatory variables (not reported), country and
year fixed effects. FPI is the country-specific food price index; AIC, Akaike information
criterion; AUC, Area Under the Curve. N = 10722
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Appendix C
A spatial analysis of the effect of
foreign aid in conflict areas
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C.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure C.1: Conflict incidence (left) and aid locations (right) for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 1999-2008. Capital indicated with black diamond.
Figure C.2: Conflict incidence (left) and aid locations (right) for Ethiopia, 1999-2008.
Capital indicated with black diamond.
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Figure C.3: Conflict incidence (left) and aid locations (right) for Sudan, 1999-2008.
Capital indicated with black diamond.
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C.2 Local Moran’s I test
To correct for spatial autocorrelation in the outcome variable the spatial lag is included
in the model structuring the model as a spatial autoregressive model (SAR).1 This
section reports the tests results of the Moran’s I test for spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s
I statistic is a global measure of spatial autocorrelation, which means that it assumes
that the spatial process is homogeneous across the different regions.
Two different measures for conflict are tested: conflict intensity which is measured by
the natural log of the number of battle-related fatalities, and conflict incidence level
which is the sum of all conflict years between 1999-2008. Additionally I also test foreign
aid for spatial autocorrelation which is in this case measure by the natural log of the
total amount of foreign aid committed to the region.
Results for the Moran’s I test, done at the provincial (ADM1) and district (ADM2)
level, are shown in table C.2 where the odd columns report the results using the
binary spatial weights matrix and even columns for the row-standardised matrix as a
robustness check.2 Although the Moran’s I test performs well in small samples (Anselin
Table C.2: Moran’s I
Province level (ADM1) District level (ADM2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict intensity 0.07 0.03 0.47*** 0.48***
Conflict incidence 0.18** 0.14* 0.41*** 0.46***
Foreign aid − 0.04 − 0.08 0.04 0.03
Row standardised − Yes − Yes
Notes. Test statistics obtained under randomisation. Number of Monte Carlo simulations
under randomisation: 10,000. N = 29 for ADM1, and N = 136 for ADM2. *** p≤
0.01, ** p≤ 0.05, * p≤ 0.1.
1The SAR model is chosen based on the assumption that the interdependence in the outcome variable
is more than just a nuisance which can be corrected using a spatial error model, and thus needs an
autoregressive term to correctly model the spatial pattern.
2Note that in this case the spatial weights matrix only includes regions in the selected countries and
thus omits data attributes in regions in neighbouring countries.
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and Florax, 1995) it could be that the results are sensitive to the skewed distribution
on the spatial data attributes. Since there are a relatively few number of observations
as the test is done at the cross-sectional level, the Moran’s I is estimated using Monte
Carlo simulations.3 Moran’s I is measured on a −1 to 1 scale where 0 indicates no
spatial autocorrelations, small values (approaching −1) indicate spatial diffusion and
large values (approaching 1) indicate spatial clustering.
The results show that there is some variability in the extent of spatial autocorre-
lation with respect to conflict comparing across the levels of aggregation and the two
different measures. For conflict intensity the results indicate that there is almost no
spatial autocorrelation at the provincial level as the test shows no statistically significant
results and are accompanied by values with very low magnitude.
For the district level on the other hand we see that there is spatial autocorrelation
between the regions were districts with similar levels of fatalities, and thus conflict
intensity, tend to cluster. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level and
also robust to using a different spatial weights matrix and using a cruder measure for
conflict. These results are also illustrated by the local Moran’s I plot shown in figure
C.4 for both the provincial and district level, where regions tend to cluster at the lower
left for low intensity and upper right for high intensity.
Focussing on the simple incidence measure the results do show some autocorrelation
at the provincial level in this case but the magnitude is much lower compared to the
district level. It is likely that the difference in results is driven by the level of aggregation
and thus by the size of the administrative level, indicating that the clusters of violence
in general tend to be relatively small and highly localised. As far as foreign aid is
concerned the test results rule out any strong spatial dependence between regions as all
test statistics are close to zero, fail to reach statistical significance, and this result is
not sensitive to the level of aggregation.
3N=29 for the ADM1 level and N=136 for ADM2 level.
183
Figure C.4: Local Moran’s I measures at the provincial level (top) and district level
(bottom).
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C.3 Preliminaries
Figure C.6: Spatial distribution for the Democratic Republic of the Congo of conflict
(left) and aid (right) relative to the capital. The size of the circle indicates the number
of fatalities or the amount of foreign aid in U.S.$.
Figure C.7: Spatial distribution for Ethiopia of conflict (left) and aid (right) relative
to the capital. The size of the circle indicates the number of fatalities or the amount of
foreign aid in U.S.$.
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Figure C.8: Spatial distribution for Sudan of conflict (left) and aid (right) relative to
the capital. The size of the circle indicates the number of fatalities or the amount of
foreign aid in U.S.$.
Figure C.9: Density of nearest neighbour distance for conflict and aid.
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C.3.1 Kernel density estimation
Figure C.10 shows the kernel density estimation results, using the cross-sectional data
of aid and conflict, where darker shaded areas indicate higher density values.4 There is
some clustering of aid and conflict in the region west of the DRC capital, the Eastern
part of DRC, the Southern part of Sudan5, and the Somali region in Ethiopia. However,
these values are predominantly driven by conflict incidence and since the estimation
is based on cross-sectional data it is not possible to establish the causal direction as
conflict ridden areas might see an influx of aid.6
Figure C.10: Kernel density estimation cross-section foreign aid projects and conflict
incidence.
4Figure C.11 shows kernel density estimations for aid and conflict separately.
5What is now the independent nation of South Sudan. On an unrelated note, this is also where the
Nubian giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis camelopardalis), one of the nine subspecies of giraffe, can be
found.
6Besides a visual inspection I also used a spatial Kolmgorov-Smirnov test to estimate the goodness-
of-fit of a Complete Spatial Randomness (CRS) pattern, generated by a Poisson process, with the
observed values based on the distribution of the longitude coordinates of each point. For both conflict
incidence and foreign aid locations I find that the null hypothesis of a random spatial pattern is rejected
at the 99% level with D-statistics of 0.13 and 0.18 respectively (Nconflict = 885, Naid = 754).
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Figure C.11: Kernel density estimations conflict incidence (left) and aid locations
(right).
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C.4 Regression results
Table C.3: Predicting changes in conflict intensity (province level)
Specifications Parsimonious Main Gov. Extended Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign aid −0.3 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2
(−0.8; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3)
Foreign aid
to government 0.2 0.2
(−0.4; 0.8) (−0.4; 0.8)
Fungible aid 0
(−0.5; 0.5)
Non-fungible aid −0.5
(−1.0; 0)
Spatial lag −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.1
(−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.8; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.4)
Temporal lag −1.4 −1.4 −1.4 −1.4
(−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9; −0.9)
Population −0.2
(−0.7; 0.4)
Night lights −0.1
(−0.6; 0.5)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All models include year indicators.
Estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains with 40,000 iterations each where the first 10,000 are discarded
as burn-in, thinning rate was set to 5. Priors are N(0, 10). N = 203.
Table C.4: Predicting changes in conflict intensity (district level)
Specifications Parsimonuous Main Gov. Extended Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign aid −0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
(−0.3; 0.1) (−0.17; 0.19) (−0.17; 0.19) (−0.17; 0.19)
Foreign aid
to government −0.1 −0.1
(−0.3; 0.1) (−0.3; 0.1)
Fungible aid 0.02
(−0.15; 0.20)
Non-fungible aid −0.06
(−0.24; 0.12)
Spatial lag 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11
(−0.06; 0.30) (−0.05; 0.30) (−0.05; 0.30) (−0.07; 0.29)
Temporal lag −1.32 −1.32 −1.33 −1.31
(−1.50, −1.14) (−1.50, −1.14) (−1.51, −1.14) (−1.49; −1.14)
Population −0.12
(−0.31; 0.07)
Night lights 0
(−0.19; 0.19)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All models include year indicators.
Estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains with 40,000 iterations each where the first 10,000 are discarded
as burn-in, thinning rate was set to 5. Priors are N(0, 10). N = 952
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Table C.5: OLS estimation province level
Specifications Parsimonious Main Gov. Extended Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign aid −0.3 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Foreign aid
to government 0.2 0.2
(0.3) (0.3)
Fungible aid 0
(0.3)
Non-fungible aid −0.5
(0.2)**
Spatial lag −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Temporal lag −1.4 −1.4 −1.4 −1.4
(0.3)*** (0.3)*** (0.3)*** (0.3)***
Population −0.2
(0.2)
Night lights −0.1
(0.2)
adjusted R2 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
AIC 841.5 815.3 816.8 820.4 814.3
Notes. N = 203. AIC, Akaike information criterion. Robust
standard errors clustered at unit level (given in parentheses).
*** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
Table C.6: OLS estimation district level
Specifications Parsimonious Main Gov. Extended Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign aid −0.1 0 0 0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Foreign aid
to government −0.1 −0.1
(0.1) (0.1)
Fungible aid 0
(0.1)
Non-fungible aid −0.06
(0.10)
Spatial lag 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.1)
Temporal lag −1.3 −1.3 −1.3 −1.3
(0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)***
Population −0.12
(0.07)*
Night lights 0
(0.05)
adjusted R2 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
AIC 3529.9 3340.5 3340.7 3343.2 3342.0
Notes. N = 952. AIC, Akaike information criterion. Robust
standard errors clustered at unit level (given in parentheses).
*** p≤ 0.01, ** p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
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Table C.7: Interaction effects province level
Specifications Time lag Space lag Distance Ethnicity
Foreign aid −0.2 −0.2 −0.1 −0.2
(−0.7; 0.3) (−0.8; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.4) (−0.7; 0.4)
Foreign aid x
time lag −0.4
(−1.5; 0.8)
Foreign aid x
spatial lag 0.1
(−0.6; 0.8)
Foreign aid x
distance to capital −1
(−3; 1)
Foreign aid x
ethnic polarisation −0.3
(−1.1; 0.6)
Spatial lag −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2
(−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3) (−0.7; 0.3)
Temporal lag −1.4 −1.4 −1.4 −1.4
(−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9, −0.9) (−1.9; −0.9)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All
the estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains with 40,000 iterations each
where the first 10,000 are discarded as burn-in, thinning rate was set to 5. Priors are
N(0, 10).
Table C.8: Interaction effects district level
Specifications Time lag Space lag Distance Ethnicity
Foreign aid 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(−0.16; 0.20) (−0.17; 0.19) (−0.16; 0.21) (−0.17; 0.19)
Foreign aid x
time lag −0.4
(−0.7; −0.1)
Foreign aid x
spatial lag −0.1
(−0.4; 0.2)
Foreign aid x
distance to capital −0.1
(−0.7;0.4)
Foreign aid x
ethnic polarisation −0.2
(−0.5; 0.2)
Spatial lag 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
(−0.07; 0.29) (−0.06; 0.30) (−0.06; 0.30) (−0.06; 0.30)
Temporal lag −1.30 −1.32 −1.32 −1.31
(−1.48, −1.13) (−1.50, −1.14) (−1.49, −1.14) (−1.49, −1.14)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All
the estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains with 40,000 iterations each
where the first 10,000 are discarded as burn-in, thinning rate was set to 5. Priors are
N(0, 10).
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Table C.9: Predicting changes in conflict intensity: Aid shocks
Provinces (N = 203) Districts (N = 952)
Specifications (1) (2)
σ Foreign aid −0.2 −0.06
(−0.7; 0.4) (−0.24; 0.12)
Spatial lag −0.3 0.12
(−0.8; 0.3) (−0.06; 0.30)
Temporal lag −1.4 −1.31
(−1.9, −0.9) (−1.49; −1.13)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All
models include year indicators. Estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel chains
with 40,000 iterations each where the first 10,000 are discarded as burn-in, thinning rate
was set to 5. Priors are N(0, 10).
Table C.10: Predicting conflict onset (logit)
Provinces (N = 203) Districts (N = 952)
Specifications (1) (2)
∆ Foreign aid 0.4 0.4
(−0.8; 1.7) (−0.1;0.9)
Spatial lag −0.6 0
(−1.9; 0.6) (−0.5; 0.5)
Population −1.0 −0.4
(−4; 1) (−1.2; 0.3)
Night lights 0.4 0.1
(−0.7; 1.6) (−0.6; 0.7)
Ethnic polarisation 0.2 1.2
(−1.6; 2.0) (0.5; 2.0)
Natural resources 1 0.3
(−2; 4) (−0.4;1.0)
Mean intercept −3 −3
(−9; 3) (−10; 4)
Notes. Table presents point estimates with their 95% intervals between parentheses. All
models include year indicators. All the estimates are taken as the mean from 4 parallel
chains with 40,000 iterations each where the first 10,000 are discarded as burn-in, thinning
rate was set to 5. Priors are N(0, 10).
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Figure C.12: Separation plot for province (top) and district (bottom) level. The
separation plot (Greenhill et al., 2011) orders the cases from left to right according to
their predicted probability. The dark grey lines indicate positive cases (conflict onset)
and light grey lines negative cases. The figure illustrates that the model is marginally
better at predicting the outcome at the district than at the province level.
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Appendix D
Using climate variability to
predict war in Sub-Saharan
Africa
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D.1 Complementary results
D.1.1 Logit estimation
Re-estimating the model using logit (results in table D.1) shows that for model 1 and
2 the effect of temperature ceases to be statistically significant within the traditional
boundaries.1 Model 3 does report a statistically significant coefficient for temperature
but the magnitude of the effect is lower than that of GDP: at the upper bound, a unit
increase in temperature corresponds with a 29.5% positive difference in the probability
of observing war, while a unit increase in GDP per capita decreases the likelihood of
war by 79.5%.
Table D.1: Results model estimation using logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Temperature 1.3 1.4 1.2
(0.9) (0.9) (0.6)**
Temperature(t−1) 0.4 0.6 0.6
(0.9) (1.1) (0.7)
Precipitation −0.9 −0.8
(2.3) (1.6)
Precipitation(t−1) 2.0 0
(2.1) (1.6)
GPD per capita(t−1) −3.2
(1.6)***
Regime type(t−1) 0
(0.1)
Deviance 165.52 164.45 255.96
AIC 333.52 336.45 345.96
AUC 0.9805 0.9805 0.936
N 889 889 815
Number of wars 98 98 81
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes −
Time FE − − Yes
Notes. Intercept not reported. FE, fixed effects; AIC, Akaike information criterion.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level (given in parentheses). *** p≤ 0.01,
** p≤ 0.05, *≤ 0.1
1Note that due to the inclusion of the country and year indicators perfect prediction occurs in
countries with little variation in the outcome variable.
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D.1.2 Explanatory power variables
As stated in the main text, p-values are not meant as a definitive test (Nuzzo, 2014)
but serve as an indicator for results that are worth closer examination. As Ward et al.
(2010) argue we should not rely too much on these p-values to determine the strength
of a particular model and be cautious about the implied effects.
A useful measure for the explanatory power of variables of interest is the change in the
AUC statistics. To gauge the in-sample predictive power of temperature I re-estimate
model 3 omitting one variable at a time to measure the change in the AUC statistic.
The results shown in figure D.1 illustrate that in general most variables have very little
explanatory power, and in some cases the model is even better off not including them in
the model specification. Although temperature seems to be the best predictor of armed
conflict, its explanatory power is marginal. Omitting temperature from the model leads
to a reduction of 0.002 in predictive power.
Figure D.1: Statistical significance versus predictive power of variables (model also
includes country and time fixed effects).
197
D.1.3 In-sample predictions
Using pˆ > 0.5 as the threshold for predicted war, the main model (model 1) correctly
predicts 73 conflicts while generating 11 false positives and 25 false negatives. The
specific cases are shown in table D.2.
Most of the false positives are generated for countries that have high levels of conflict
prevalence such as Sudan which experienced conflict in 18 out of the 22 years in the
sample and Angola (17 out of 19). The model has more trouble with correctly predicting
conflict in countries with relatively lower levels of war prevalence such as Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, and Chad. These results seem to suggest that the fitted probabilities of this
model are driven largely by country-specific trends rather than the temperature variable.
Estimating the model omitting the temperature variable and only including fixed effects
and country-specific time trends leads to almost exactly the same predictions. The only
difference is that South Africa-1987 has a lower predicted probability leading to an
additional false negative.
Table D.2: Actual versus predicted wars in-sample for 1981-2002
pˆ ≤ 0.5 pˆ > 0.5
No war 780 obs. Angola (1996-1997)
DRC (2002)
Ethiopia (1986)
South Africa (1984-1985)
Sudan (1981-1982, 1993-1994)
Uganda (1990)
War Burundi (1998) Angola (1981-1995, 1998-1999)
Chad (1987, 1990) Burundi (2000-2002)
DRC (1997-2000) Ethiopia (1981-1985, 1987-1990)
Congo (1997-1998) Mozambique (1981-1992)
Ethiopia (1991) South Africa (1981-1983, 1986-1987)
Guinea-Bissau (1998) Sudan (1983-1992, 1995-2002)
Liberia (1990-1992) Uganda (1981-1989)
Rwanda (1991-1992, 1998, 2001)
Sierra Leone (1998-1999)
Somalia (1988, 1990-1992)
South Africa (1988)
Uganda (1991)
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D.1.4 Additional figures
Figure D.2: Average temperature over time for 1980-2013. The light shaded lines
represent the country average, the dark shaded line the continent average. The vertical
line indicates 2003. Data: Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia.
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Figure D.3: Number of civil conflicts and war over time for 1980-2013. "Conflict"
includes all conflicts with the number of battle-related deaths between 25-999, while
"War" includes all conflicts with the number of battle-related deaths above 1,000. Data:
UCDP/PRIO.
Figure D.4: Forecast model only including country fixed effects and country-specific
time trends
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D.1.5 Out of sample predictions
Table D.3: Actual versus predicted wars out-of-sample for 2003-2013 (Model with
country fixed effects and country-specific time trends only)
pˆ ≤ 0.5 pˆ > 0.5
No war 403 obs. Angola (2003-2007)
Burundi (2003-2013)
DRC (2003-2012)
Rwanda (2010-2013)
Sudan (2005, 2007-2009)
War Chad (2006) DRC (2013)
Liberia (2003) Sudan (2003, 2004, 2006, 2010-2013)
Nigeria (2013)
Rwanda (2009)
Somalia (2007-2012)
Uganda (2004)
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